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Abstract—Fog computing is an emerging computing paradigm
that has come into consideration for the deployment of IoT
applications amongst researchers and technology industries over
the last few years. Fog is highly distributed and consists of a
wide number of autonomous end devices, which contribute to
the processing. However, the variety of devices offered across
different users are not audited. Hence, the security of Fog
devices is a major concern in the Fog computing environment.
Furthermore, mitigating and preventing those security measures
is a research issue. Therefore, to provide the necessary security
for Fog devices, we need to understand what the security concerns
are with regards to Fog. All aspects of Fog security, which have
not been covered by other literature works needs to be identified
and need to be aggregate all issues in Fog security. It needs to be
noted that computation devices consist of many ordinary users,
and are not managed by any central entity or managing body.
Therefore, trust and privacy is also a key challenge to gain market
adoption for Fog. To provide the required trust and privacy, we
need to also focus on authentication, threats and access control
mechanisms as well as techniques in Fog computing. In this paper,
we perform a survey and propose a taxonomy, which presents an
overview of existing security concerns in the context of the Fog
computing paradigm. We discuss the Blockchain-based solutions
towards a secure Fog computing environment and presented
various research challenges and directions for future research.
Index Terms—Fog security, IoT security, access control, Fog
computing, authentication, trust management, privacy, threats
and attacks, auditing, Blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE computational world has become very broad andcomplicated as our expectation is going beyond con-
necting people. We are about to approach a new era, where
everything will be connected. With the swift development of
technology, many individuals and organizations are starting to
provide services to users with the help of their smart devices
such as cell phones, home appliances, vehicles, wearable
embedded devices, sensors, and actuators. The underlying
work is performed by massive-scaled wireless sensor networks
and realms of connected devices, which is aptly termed as
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the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT has achieved much attention
over the last couple of years and has been enumerated as the
predestination of the Internet. Technology consulting organi-
zation Gartner highlighted that the total number of connected
devices by the year-end of 2020 [1] would be more than
20 billion devices that exist across various consumers and
business organizations. Moreover, Norton security organisation
predicted that by 2025 there will be more than 21 billion
devices [2]. As IoT continues to flourish, a huge number of
sensors have been devoted to diversified devices, which are
swiftly leading to an increased amount of generated data and
storage requirements on a regular basis [3].
Although we are used to depending on the cloud for
IoT application processing, the exponential growth of IoT
devices continues to generate huge amounts of data, which
means we will be unable to depend on any central entity
such as the cloud computing paradigm to process these huge
amounts of data. The Fog computing paradigm is evolving to
serve various services while simultaneously managing numer-
ous sensors, actuators, users, processes, and connectivity by
placing processing facilities closer to users. Also, the edge
devices generate data from their designated areas and link
with each other or transmit to the neighboring Fog nodes for
supplementary analytics and decisions. The Fog computing
paradigm can solve the time-sensitive application processing
limitations of the cloud as well as supporting IoT applications.
Fog devices reside at the network edge to facilitate computing
services near to the users and deliver services as well as
applications for billions of connected devices. This helps to
support real-time processing, storage and networking facilities
at the edge level [4].
Since smart devices or Fog devices are categorized as
resource constraints, the Fog computing paradigm will face
many challenges such as the limitations of storage, bandwidth,
battery, and computation power, which leads to obstruction in
the rise of IoT. To overcome the encumbrance of these limita-
tions, the cloud computing paradigm is perceived as a talented
computing archetype, which can distribute services to the edge
via the cloud in terms of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),
Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS)
solutions which offer applications and services with resilient
resources at low costs [5]. Over the last decennium, cloud com-
puting has obtained an immense reputation among researchers.
Real-time IoT application services and information access are
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possible any time and anywhere via this paradigm. Cloud
computing also offers diverse features to users such as ease
of access to information, cost efficiency, quick deployment,
backup, and recovery. Although cloud computing has fulfilled
most of the demands of modern technology, it may not be
a suitable solution as there are still unresolved problems,
whereas IoT devices and applications need to be processed
swiftly. This is beyond the existing capabilities of cloud com-
puting. Hence, security and privacy, data segregation, mobility
support, low latency, location-awareness, geo-distribution, and
real-time applications are required for IoT applications. While
Fog computing offers a much more advantageous system as
opposed to cloud-based systems, there are several security
issues at hand which can cause interruptions to the way
deployment is carried out using Fog computing.
In reality, due to the associated privacy and security risks
for cloud-based systems, nearly 74% of Information and com-
munications technology (ICT) executive officers have rejected
adopting cloud computing [6]. Fog computing is not at a
mature stage and continues to face new challenges due to its
exclusive features. In the Fog computing environment, most
devices are managed and maintained across different users.
The Fog computing paradigm uses idle resources generated
from user devices. These devices are not audited by any
standard body, which raises security concerns in the Fog
environment. On the other hand, secure and fast authentication
mechanisms are required for Fog since many devices are
involved in the Fog application processing. Furthermore, we
have to be very concerned about access control since most of
the application processing is carried out in the user devices.
The security issues across various layers of the Fog computing
environment is presented in Fig. 1.
A. Existing related surveys on Fog computing security
There has been a variety of techniques proposed in the
literature to address the security issues of the emerging Fog
computing. Most of these research papers either presented
Fog security concerns or merely focused on one aspect of
Fog security. Here, we have summarized and given a concise
overview with regards to Fog security by combining the
opinions across several of these research works.
Yi et al. [7] briefly examined various security issues and
tried to identify various challenge domains corresponding to
the solutions of the Fog computing environment. Zhang et
al. [8] discussed and analyzed the adhering potential security
and trust issues, and explored solutions which are currently
available for those issues. Khan et al. [9] explored common
security gaps in Fog computing from the existing surveys.
Alrawais et al. [10] investigated and discussed the various
privacy and security issues in Fog computing environments.
Rauf et al. [11] discussed IoT, Fog and their security issues.
Stojmenovic et al. [12] investigated intrusion detection and
authentication techniques in Fog computing. Wang et al. [13]
presented and discussed the concerns and challenges in Fog
forensics and security. Recently, Roman et al. [14] explored
potential threats associated with the mobile edge, mobile
cloud, and Fog computing.
In current literature, there is a gap in the aggregation of
all Fog security-related issues. None of the literary works
presented a critical evaluation of all aspects of Fog security,
as has been done in this paper. Neither did they discuss
Fog security issues from the auditing perspective. Different
studies regarding Fog computing security and privacy did not
cover the various security issues related to the Fog computing
architecture and its environment. In this paper, we will explore
and explain various security concerns related to the Fog com-
puting environment from the auditing perspective. Since Fog
computing extends to the cloud system, therefore, most of the
cloud computing security concerns [15] are being inherited and
impacts Fog computing as well. We have focused our attention
on significant security, threats and attack issues such as trust
management, privacy, authentication, and access control. We
linked these security concerns with Fog and explained how
these concerns could affect Fog security. In addition, we
discussed how blockchain could mitigate some Fog related
security issues. We have systematically focused our attention
on significant security and threat-attack issues from several
selected sets of papers to provide a detailed landscape in this
field./
B. Research Motivation
Cloud computing is already recognized by its widespread
deployment amongst its targeted environment. However, it
faces numerous obstacles such as latency, bandwidth, Qual-
ity of Service (QoS), trust, security, privacy, trust, threats,
and attacks, etc. during the early stages of its deployment.
Therefore, privacy and security are the key challenges for the
cloud computing paradigm. In the case of Fog computing, it
was inaugurated as a new computing paradigm, which has
emerged over the last few years as a bridge between cloud
data centers and edge devices or IoT devices. The main aim
of Fog computing is to improve the existing problems of cloud
computing by improving the communication latency, real-time
processing, privacy and security. Nevertheless, Fog computing
also faces many privacy and security concerns as it is in
its early stages. User devices and end devices are the main
components for computation in the Fog environment, which
is not usually audited by any security standard. Therefore, the
key aim of this work is to come up with a methodical review
on state-of-the-art approaches and techniques in accosting
Fog computing security and privacy issues from the auditing
perspective and pinpoint challenges as well as the possible
direction for researchers and application developers.
1) Paper Selection Approaches: To exploit the coverage of
the searched literature in this work, we began by identifying
the most used alternative words and synonyms in the research
questionnaire. Therefore, we conducted our selection strategy
based on our proposed taxonomy and Table I searching
criteria. We first categorized the current research security
issues and challenges for Fog computing into six categories:
1. Trust, 2. Privacy, 3. Authentication, 4. Access-Control, 5.
Threats and Attacks, 6. Security Audit. We also looked into
the security issues and solutions of other areas such as cloud,
edge computing, and blockchain which could suit the Fog
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Fig. 1. Security issues and attacks at each layer
computing environment. In order to focus on the most relevant
articles based on the aims of our research, we also constructed
different search strings using Boolean AND and OR operators.
Then, we conducted a manual search (Fog computing security
issue or privacy and security issue in Fog computing), using
different search engines such as Google, Bing, Baidu etc. in
the area of cloud, Fog computing security based on the search
criteria in Table I. The same approach was applied in renowned
scientific research databases such as Google Scholar, ACM
Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, Springer, Science Direct and
ResearchGate. Fig. 2 presents our paper selection approach.
We used the tool Mendeley and Google Scholar to manage
citations from all extracted articles. We conducted our paper
selection and evaluation based on the various criteria as shown
in Table I.
2) Evaluation of Results: After the initial exploration using
several search strings from the sources above, we found almost
220 relevant papers and articles. After searching, filtering,
inclusion and exclusion reviews, 127 articles were matched
from the first filtration. With respect to our taxonomy, we have
separated all these papers into various partitions.
3) Research Questions: This work is going to answer the
following research questions:
Q1 What are the different security issues in Fog which need
further investigation?
Q2 What are the all security aspects of Fog and how to
categorize them?
TABLE I
PAPER SELECTION CRITERIA
Sl. No. Criteria
01 Relevant to study of the cloud or Fogcomputing
02 Directly or indirectly related to cloud and Fogcomputing security
03 Fog computing security issues
04 Security and privacy issues in Fog computing
05 Security and trust issues in Fog computing
06 Authentication and authorization in FogComputing
07 Authentication and access Control in FogComputing
08 Privacy preservation in Fog computing
09 Threats and attacks issues in Fog computing
10 Security auditing standards in Fog computing
Q3 How current research works addressed Fog security con-
cerns? What are the other possible solution and what se-
curity concerns need attention to the research community?
Section II to IV are answering our first two research
question. The third research question is answered by section
IV, V and VI.
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Fig. 2. Paper selection process.
C. Our Contributions
This survey is intended to provide an exhaustive review
across current studies by covering all related Fog security
issues and challenges. This work also concentrates on con-
structing a review of Fog computing with a focus on the related
challenges and security issues from the auditing perspective.
The principal contributions of this study can be recapped as
follows:
• Propose a taxonomy based on various security issues such
as authentication, access control, privacy preservation,
trust management, threats, attacks, and security auditing
which are challenging for the Fog environment.
• Highlight and discusses various threats and attacks which
might be severe in the Fog environment.
• Discuss probable challenges and future research direc-
tions in Fog computing with respect to security.
• Explain how blockchain and auditing could help to mit-
igate Fog security challenges.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner
- Section II provides an overview of Fog computing. Section
III discusses the network and data security issues. Section IV
demonstrates the proposed taxonomy on security issues in Fog
computing. Section V discussed blockchain technologies in
Fog and present how blockchain technology can be utilized to
improve Fog security. Section VI and VII present the research
challenges, future research directions, and conclusions.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FOG COMPUTING
Fog computing ideally demonstrates the concept of a dis-
tributed network environment that connects two different en-
vironments and is closely linked with cloud computing and
IoT. This new computing paradigm was initially and formally
introduced by Cisco to extend the cloud network to the edge
of the enterprise network [4]. The architecture of a Fog
environment has three layers - the IoT layer, the Fog layer and
the Cloud layer, as shown in Fig. 3. The IoT layer consists
of a massive amount of sensors and end devices. This layer
Fig. 3. The Architecture of Fog Computing.
is liable for collecting and sending the data generated from
devices to the Fog devices in the Fog layer. The Fog devices
in this layer then process the received data and send the results
to the cloud to store for future use. Individuals or organizations
are providing Fog devices to process the applications in a Fog
environment by contributing their idle resources. The providers
should compensate for their offered resources based on the
usage in a way that both provider and user will be benefited
[16].
In literature, there exist similar Fog like technologies such
as Edge Computing, Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC), Cloud
Computing, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), Cloudlet, Fog
Dew Computing, Dew Computing and Micro Data Centre
[17], [9]. However, the key difference is that it creates an
enormously virtualized platform that offers diversified compu-
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TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF FOG APPLICATION
Application
domain
Application
service Description
Smart
city [18] [19]
Smart home
and Smart
office
Provides automation control in
home to control the electrical
appliances and security and alarm
systems
Electric-
ity [20][21]
Smart grid
and Smart
metering
Provides monitoring and tracking
service of energy hourly or day
wise etc.
Health-
care [22]
Smart health
monitoring
Provides continuous monitoring of
glucose, blood pressure, pulse rate
etc.
Entertainment
Augment
Reality
Provides the best user experience
in Augmented Reality
[23]
Real-time
video
streaming
and gaming
system En-
tertainment
Provides the best user experience
in video streaming and gaming
systems
Transportation
Smart
vehicle Driverless vehicles
Smart
navigation
Suggests best routes and dynamic
rerouting
[24] [25]
Road
condition
detection
Auto detects the condition of
roads and adjusts the parameters
to drive according to it
Smart traffic
lights
Reduce the traffic jams across the
junctions
tation, storage, and network services to its clients via unused
end-device resources. With the features and characteristics of
the Fog computing continuing to improve, the performances of
a wide range of domains across different real-time IoT specific
applications such as City: smart office, smart home, smart
waste management; Electricity: smart grid; smart metering,
Health: smart health care system, Transportation: smart vehicle
accident prevention; traffic flow maintenance; Smart Traffic
Light System (STLS); Traffic control system, Entertainment:
real-time video streaming and gaming systems are shown in
Table II.
The features and characteristics of Fog computing are as
follows [4]:
• Support Geographic Distribution
• Location Awareness
• Low Latency
• Heterogeneity
• Decentralization
• Large Scale QoS-aware IoT Application Support
• Mobility Support
• Interplay with Cloud
• Context Awareness
• Online Analytics
• Predominance of Wireless Access
• Close to the end users
• Save storage space
• Higher Scalability
• Save Bandwidth
• Real-time Interaction
• Data security and privacy protection
• Low energy consumption
However, Fog computing has provided numerous other is-
sues and challenges such as security and privacy. The technical
distinctions between Fog and cloud computing from a security
aspect are exhibited in Table III. The OpenFog Consortium,
technology giants, researchers and developers are strongly
trying to mitigate these issues. Therefore, if they were able
to attenuate all these issues, then it would be deemed capable
to deal with the constantly increasing number of networked
computational devices. This would then make the Fog platform
the future of computing.
In accordance with the study of Fog computing character-
istics, we have illustrated a differential table based on cloud
and Fog features - Table III. Finally, we have pointed out
a few challenges that exist for the current cloud technology.
Therefore, we have also illustrated a table and highlighted how
Fog eliminates these challenges - Table IV.
TABLE III
TECHNICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FOG AND CLOUD IN A SECURITY
PERSPECTIVE
Attributes CloudComputing Fog Computing
Security
management Centralized Distributed
Security concerns General servers Heterogeneousdevices
Attack and threat
level Low High
Security domain Within theInternet
At the edge of the
local network
Security pattern
No user
defined
security
User defined
security
Security Audit and
Analysis
Static or
manual
approach
Software based
automated
dynamic and
real-time approach
As Fog devices are much more distributed and belongs to
different users, security auditing is very important. In order
to audit the security of Fog devices, we need to explore the
network and data security issues related to Fog.
III. FOG NETWORK AND DATA SECURITY
Ensuring security for both network and data in Fog is a
challenging task due to the vastly distributed nature of Fog
computing. Most of the Fog devices are wireless, and data is
processing in the user’s devices. This section discussed the
network and data security of Fog in detail.
A. Network Security
Due to the massive deployment of wireless networks in
the Fog environment, ensuring security in these networks
is a mandatory concern. Wireless networks are prone to
attacks such as jamming, sniffers, spoofing, Man-in-the-middle
(MITM), etc. These attacks can affect the wireless network
security of Fog computing, which can take place between
the cloud to things continuum. In general, the users trust the
network configurations and data generated by the network
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TABLE IV
SECURITY CHALLENGES AT FOG
Challenges Role of Fog
Security of
computing and
access control
With Fog, the computation, process,
storage and control of sensitive tasks are
done as near as possible to the end user’s
device. In this distributed environment, all
threats and attacks first need to be faced
as Fog nodes, where Fog nodes are able
to identify all illegitimate activity and can
prevent any incidents before they are
passed through to the system.
Security of data
storage and users
privacy
In Fog environments, data is originated
from, or to sent to the end-user devices
which are managed and preserved via
secure Fog nodes. Hence, the data would
be better preserved than stored in the
user’s device and more available than if it
was maintained in remote data centers.
Security of
communication
and networking
system
A Fog network is connected by an
immense collection of Fog nodes, and it
can provide uninterrupted secure
communication and networking services
by residing near the end user’s device.
Fog reduces the chances of various
network and communication attacks.
Security of the
resource-
constrained IoT
devices
A lot of IoT devices or end devices has
limited resources. Hence, due to these
limited resources, the IoT devices have
little or no capability to defend
themselves from sophisticated
cyber-attacks. Fog nodes and cloud
servers together can provide multi-level
protection, i.e. ”defense-in-depth”.
Real-time incident
response services
In Fog networks, the Fog nodes are able
to provide real-time incident response
services that notify the IoT system
without disruption of any services.
Security challenges
in the edge
network
Because of the lack of available resources
to end devices, Fog can manage and
update security mechanisms such as
authentication, access control, trust
management, etc. Therefore it can also
protect devices that cannot protect
themselves adequately.
Security
credentials and
software up to date
It is impractical to require that all the
devices are connected several times a day
to cloud for the security credentials and
software to be updated. However, Fog
nodes are able to manage security
credentials and software updates on a
large number of devices simultaneously,
based on their criteria without downtime.
Monitor the
security status
In the IoT environment, it is crucial to be
able to notice trustworthy processes,
whether the devices and systems are
operating safely and securely. Many of
today’s hackers send false status messages
that make operations appear normal. Fog
provides a scheme to monitor security
status in a trustworthy manner and can
detect these types of attacks.
traffic which is usually managed manually by a network
administrator [26]. As Fog nodes placed at the edge of the
network, therefore, it would be an unmanageable task for
the network administrator. In such a scenario, the Software
Defined Network (SDN) will increase the scalability of the
network and decrease the cost. Hence, SDN would be a
preferable solution in Fog computing [7]. In Fog computing,
SDN can provide features for network security, for example
monitoring networks and Intrusion Detection System (IDS),
as well as watching the traffic routes which is referred to as
CloudWatch [27] and OpenFlow [28]. It also helps to isolate
the traffic and manage prioritization to prevent attacks from
network resource access controls and congested networks.
Klaedtke et al. [29] proposed a method for access control that
was based on OpenFlow and for a network resource sharing
system. The authors [30], proposed an OpenWifi, which gave
authentication to the guest users by letting them have access
to the Fog node router in context with the security issues.
B. Data Security
In Fog computing, data generated by IoT or edge devices
are gradually increasing respectively with the number of IoT
devices. Due to a lack of adequate resources for IoT devices, it
is hard to process all the data on IoT devices [10]. IoT devices
send the generated data to the nearby Fog node. After that,
this node divides the generated data into several segments and
forwards them to multiple Fog nodes for further processing.
During this division and distribution time, the data could be
altered or manipulated by attackers. Therefore, the integrity
of the data must be ensured. Hence, the encryption and
decryption process is not easy to implement due to associated
resource constraints. In this case, light-weight encryption and
decryption techniques would be a compatible solution [31].
However, user data is being outsourced as well the user’s
data control which is handed over to the Fog node. This still
brings about the same security threats associated with cloud
computing. In this circumstance, there might be a chance to
lose or modify the outsourced data. In addition, illegitimate
third parties with malicious interests might misuse the stored
data. To mitigate these threats, a proposed solution is to
present auditable data storage services, which are applicable
for cloud computing data protection. In the context of a cloud
storage system, a well-known technique is a homomorphic
encryption and searchable encryption, which could be used
to accumulate and ensure integrity, confidentiality and veri-
fiability to permit a client to investigate the data which is
stored on untrusted servers [32]. Yang et al. [33] surveyed
the existing research work related to auditing data storage
services in the context of cloud computing. Eventually, from
the circumstances above, there is still no proposed method
that can meet the criteria based on a three-tier architecture for
Fog computing. Nonetheless, it is a challenging task to design
a secure storage system, which will satisfy all requirements
(dynamic processing, low-latency, high-scalability, etc.) and
support smooth communication between the Fog and cloud
environments. To detect network and data attacks in Fog we
need to employ an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) across
various layers.
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Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is extensively used in
cloud systems to identify and help protect from attacks, such as
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, insider attacks, port scanning
attacks, flooding attacks on the VM (Virtual Machine), man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attacks, hypervisors, as well as numerous
systems [34]. It can be deployed under Supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) [35], cloud [34], smart grid
system [36] [37] etc. It can also monitor, detect intrusive
behavior of possible attackers, as well as analyze log files,
access control (AC) policies, and user access credentials. In
three-tier architecture Fog computing, IDS must be deployed
in the cloud, Fog, edge for monitoring, analysis of traffic
and intrusive activities of cloud servers, Fog nodes and edge
devices. However, establishing security alone is not enough
to provide the necessary protection against the propagation of
viruses or malware from vulnerable nodes to other parts of
the system. With regard to this situation, there may arise chal-
lenges such as corrective responses, alarm parallelization, false
alarm controls, and real-time notification [38]. A probable
solution could be to deploy a perimeter IDS that coordinates
different IDS in the Fog system [39]. On the contrary, while
ensuring security in the Fog computing environment through
IDS, several challenges may arise in terms of providing low-
latency requirements [7].
C. Security Standards in Fog
Security standards form a vital part in maintaining protec-
tion for information systems. These standards are responsible
to define the scope and security functions and features needed,
as well as policies, in order to manage the information and
human assets. Standards also help to evaluate the effectiveness
of security measures and maintain the criteria for ongoing
assessments of security. It is a necessity to consider proper
security standards and commonly used security practices in
the Fog computing environment in order to develop a feasible
choice for the enterprise community.
IEEE 1934 [40] is a standard reference architecture for
Fog to satisfy data-intensive application requirements. This
architecture was proposed based on eight key attributes of the
system, for example, RAS (reliability, availability, and ser-
viceability), scalability, autonomy, openness, security, agility,
hierarchy and programmability. For auditing purposes, we
need to figure out the taxonomy of Fog security issues. By
which, we can then identify what to audit and how to perform
auditing in Fog by following recommended standards.
IV. TAXONOMY OF SECURITY ISSUES IN FOG COMPUTING
Fog is an augmentation of cloud computing which has many
security issues. In this study, we have proposed a taxonomy,
which is based on various security issues such as trust manage-
ment, privacy assurance, authentication, access control, threats,
attacks and vulnerabilities adhering to the Fog computing
environment for auditing purposes. In the trust management
section, we have discussed trust, the scope of trust, trust
model and the potential attack on the trust computation area.
In the privacy assurance section, we have discussed different
privacy issues and privacy preservation techniques. In authen-
tication, our observation relates to authentication domains,
methods and potential attacks on the authentication processes.
In the access control section, we identified the controlling
area, requirements and access control methods. Finally, we
summarized several threats, attacks, and vulnerabilities. This
taxonomy offers a better understanding of Fog security issues
to the research community and enterprises. Fig. 4 represents
the proposed taxonomy and concise derivation of each section
in the taxonomy, which will be described in the following
subsections.
A. Trust and Trust Management in Fog Computing
The definition of trust does vary across different fields.
Trust is the level of undertaking that an entity will treat in
an appeasing way [41]. Although this definition does not
represent the proper trust definition according to the field
of computing, it can be characterized as an “expectation
that a device or system will faithfully behave in a particular
manner to fulfill its intended purpose” [42]. Therefore, trust
can support the devices that failed to communicate with each
other and desire to establish a new connection. A Fog node
might be considered safe or unsafe by relying on their trust
level.
Trust management is considered in order to establish trust
between entities. It is a system or mechanism that takes place
between two nodes in a network to established trust. It was
first introduced by Blaze et al. [43]. They defined the problem
of trust management as “the problem of figuring based on
formulated security policies and security credentials if a set of
security credentials of an entity satisfies the security policies”.
Trust management examines the way of collecting and storing
information to ensure the trustworthiness of an entity. It can
be measured with creation, updating or revoking the trust [44].
In Fog computing, the devices are responsible to provide
reliable and secured services for end-users. In this case,
there must have a definite level of trust between all the
devices in the Fog network. Authentication plays an important
part in forming a primary set of relations between the end
user’s device and Fog devices in the system. As devices can
always breakdown or become vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Authentication alone is not adequate to fix these problems.
Fog computing has an aim to elevate the trustworthiness of the
overall network. In cloud platform technology, the data centers
are typically owned and maintained by cloud service providers.
However, in the Fog platform, dissimilar parties may act as
service provides as diverse deployment options exist in such
systems [7] such as Internet service providers, Cloud services
providers, and End-users. This flexibility makes obscure the
required trust for Fog computing. Therefore, based on these
circumstances, numerous problems arise in the Fog computing
environment as follows:
• In the Fog environment client is a node that can apply the
required services as presented by the Fog device. Hence,
Fog devices are retained and upheld autonomously and
operated by various organizations or parties. In such a
case, Fog clients are required to be more vigilant in
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Fig. 4. A Taxonomy of Security Issues of Fog Computing.
the time of communication with Fog nodes. Generally,
different possessors preserve security in different ways,
and the security amongst Fog devices positioned in the
same organization may also be dissimilar in context.
Therefore, from a Fog client’s observation, Fog nodes
indicate a potentially great threat.
• From a Fog node’s perspective, the client is also consid-
ered as a potential threat. These services can comprise
of various scripts or harmful cipher with destructive
consequences to the Fog node’s software or hardware.
• Data is collected from the Fog clients through the Fog
network and it can be used for further work. However,
after the data is collected from Fog clients, it might be
corrupted or lost during the propagation process.
• Fog nodes can be deployed by anyone or any organiza-
tion. Therefore, setting up a Fog node that may become a
threat to the whole network may be complicated [12]. A
rouge Fog device can send illegal data and run over the
entire network, which can have undesirable influences on
the entire network performance and amplify the packet
loss. This compromises Fog nodes or rouge nodes which
can hamper the legitimate nodes in the Fog network.
• Usually, Fog nodes can be installed or deployed near the
end-users, so that Fog nodes are easily accessible and
can be tampered with spontaneously. If node hardware
or software is tampered with, it will become a potential
threat for the entire network. Therefore, data that is shared
with the tampered Fog device can be exposed or revealed
to unauthorized entities.
• Any Fog device which is compromised can be a source
from which originates malicious objects which can im-
pact the reliability of the whole Fog network.
In such scenarios, trust helps to maintain the relations built
upon preceding interactions of devices or entities. Trust must
play a two-way responsibility in the Fog environment [45].
First, the nodes that provide services to edge devices must be
competent to authenticate the service requests to comprehend
if the request is fake or genuine. Second, the edge devices
that send or request data must be competent to authenticate
the intentions of the node to guarantee its security. Therefore,
applying the trust mechanism in the Fog environment permits
Fog nodes, resource-limited IoT devices, and other Fog clients
to identify the future behavior of one another. When identifi-
cation of future behavior becomes probable, then Fog clients
can easily choose a trusted Fog node that will provide the best
services. As a sign of the problems presented in the solution
of trust management, for a Fog system, there is a need to
identify and detect all accidental or intentional behavior which
can enable authorities to take the necessary action and rebuild
the trust formation instantaneously [7]. The key factors that
influence Fog computing are trust scope, trust characteristics
and trust evaluation models.
Trust Scope: Guo et al. [46] demonstrated current methods
of trust computation in the IoT system. They categorized
the trust computing scheme into five scopes: aggregating,
formation, update, propagation and trust composition. We can
consider this scope of trust for the Fog computing environment
as well. This segment will demonstrate each of these scopes
in detail as below:
• Trust Aggregation: collect all the recommendations
from others and combine them with one’s own experi-
ences in the trust computation which might be essential.
Trust Aggregation elects how this is accomplished.
• Trust Formation: this defines the way to enable a
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combination of trust properties by trust composition.
Some methods just study one property, and others reflect
a mixture of some properties.
• Trust Update: it shows how often the trust values are
updated. Periodical updates and Event-driven are two key
methods.
• Trust Propagation: it decides on how to select a dis-
tributed or centralized process to compute and store the
trust.
• Trust Composition: it defines a group of trust properties.
It chooses what components have been used in the trust
computation process. Social trust and service quality are
the two key elements.
Characteristics of Trust in Fog Computing: This section
describes the characteristics of trust in Fog computing. Various
characteristics of trust that help develop trust relationships
related to the understanding of Fog computing much further.
The authors [47] defined a few characteristics, which can be
retained for the Fog environment.
• Is trust dynamic? Trust requires to be dynamic be-
cause of two reasons. First, the Fog system network
topology is changing continuously as new devices join
or leave concurrently on the Fog network. Then, devices
in the network may deflect their behavior successively.
Therefore, trust should be monitored uninterruptedly. For
example, for the past year, entity A had a high trust
towards entity B. However, recently, entity A found that
entity B lied to entity A. Consequently, there is no trust
between these two entities anymore.
• Is trust subjective? Although Fog networks are formed
with a wide range of objects or devices, its security re-
quirements vary from object to object or device to device.
So, their trust properties are different, which is carried out
more importantly over other properties. Having different
types of trust policies for different objects, the trust will
be subjective.
• Is trust transitive within a context? Following subjec-
tive issues, each device has a distinct security policy of
its own. That is, if device A trusts device C, then device
A may trust any device that device C trusts in the same
context. However, this concludes that the trust might be
explicit and difficult to be measured.
• Is trust asymmetric? Trust is an asymmetric relationship
in nature. Being asymmetric in nature, trust is contrary to
non-mutual relationships. It means that if device A trusts
device B, we must not suggest that device B trusts device
A.
• Is trust context-dependent? Context is significant in
terms of Fog computing [48] and at the same time, it is
significant in terms of trust computing as well. Suppose,
we might trust a friend to keep a secret, but not to keep
our money with him. The same scenario can be applied
in the Fog environment. One Fog device can be trusted
to accomplish a particular task for a client in the Fog
environment, but for another task, it may not trust the
same Fog device. Therefore, in this situation trust needs
to be context-dependent.
1) Trust Evaluation Models: Although Fog computing is
vulnerable to any sort of illegitimate entity, it is important to
ensure an effective and secure trust model that is compatible
with trust computation in Fog computing.
While trust is classified amongst the imperative security
requirements in Fog, there is quite a limited range of studies
in the field. Most of the studies have just concentrated on the
field of cloud computing.
Till now, there is no strongly recommended trust model for
Fog computing, but we can enumerate already existing trust
models from IoT and cloud computing. In this section, we
are going to discuss a few renowned trust models which are
competent for Fog computing.
• Reputation-based: The reputation-based trust
model [49] is broadly applied in peer-to-peer (P2P),
e-commerce services, social media, and user reviews.
Occasionally, the fame of a service provider is beneficial
to select amongst diverse service providers. Damiani et
al. [50] demonstrated a reputation system model for P2P
networks by applying a distributed polling algorithm to
evaluate the consistency of the model. As this model
sturdily relies on a general view, it is not appropriate
in Fog computing as the nature of the end devices is
dynamic. Moreover, Abhijit et al. [51] introduced a
trust-based model to provide application layer security
that can deal with the issues of user privacy, integrity
and authentication. Hence, it will function as a trust-
related safeguard in the Fog ecosystem for IoT related
applications.
• Plausibility-based: Soleymani et al. [52] proposed an
experienced and plausibility-based fuzzy trust model to
secure a vehicular network. In a vehicular network appli-
cation, it is significant to establish a trust to keep integrity
and reliability. Hence, in vehicular environments, a secure
trust model can handle the uncertainty and risks originat-
ing from defective information. Eventually, there are also
several trusted models [7] regarding special hardware.
• Trusted execution environment (TEE): TEE is an iso-
lated environment, which guarantees the confidentiality
and integrity of code and data by executing in the secure
area inside a processor.
• Secure element (SE): SE stores sensitive information
securely and run the apps in a microprocessor chip to
protect the data and application from malware attacks.
• Trusted platform module (TPM): TPM stores the host
identification key pairs, which are used for hardware
authentication inside a specialized chip. The data inside
this chip cannot be accessed by software.
2) Attacks on Trust Computation Environment: In Fog
computing, while Fog nodes and clients are communicating
with each other, they must establish a connection with greater
trust value in the Fog network. For Fog nodes and clients,
the highly trusted nodes and clients will be selected and
accepted frequently rather than Fog nodes and clients with
lower trust. It helps to speed up the overall performance of
the Fog network [46]. Malicious intruders will impersonate
their nodes as highly trusted nodes, so that, they can gain the
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possibility of compromising a network. In this segment we are
going to define several types of attacks which might occur in
the Fog network:
• Self-promotion attack (SPA): in SPA attack, the mali-
cious Fog nodes increase their trust values to impersonate
themselves as the highest trusted nodes.
• Bad-mouthing attack (BMA): this attack works by
spreading fictitious information. Several malicious Fog
nodes work together to provide depraved suggestions
about a decent Fog node, which will damage the fame of
those nodes. This is a form of a collision attack, and it
happens when numerous malicious nodes come together
to spread false information.
• Ballot-stuffing attack (BSA): this attack is similar to the
collusion attack, where a malicious node transfers decent
suggestion regarding another wicked node to raise the
fame of the malicious nodes.
• Opportunistic service attacks (OSA): after assuming
that the fame has been lowered down by the Fog node,
it can achieve a great service to retrieve its reputation.
• On-off attack (OOA): A malicious Fog node can provide
bad and good services simultaneously to avoid being
rated as a low trusted node. The OOA attacker can also
behave differently with different neighbors to achieve an
inconsistent trust opinion of the same node.
In accordance with the study above and based on different
issues, we have illustrated, a summary table on the existing
related research works related to trust issues are shown in
Table V.
B. Privacy in Fog Computing
Privacy is a key issue in any distributed environment. Across
available literature, there are many mechanisms, which have
been proposed to ensure the privacy of the data, such as
encryption and hashing. However, these techniques are not
suitable in the Fog, because it affects the latency and time
to process the application. The remaining part of the section
discusses in detail the privacy assurance issues.
Privacy Assurance: Privacy assurance helps to preserve
any private information, such as data, user, usage, locations,
devices, network from unauthorized access [56] [57]. In Fog
Computing, all the data used comes from various sources like
IoT devices, wireless networks as well as cloud networks.
These data might be meaningful or meaningless, but we need
to preserve it. Thus, appropriate privacy assurance can be
treated as a substantial security issue in the Fog environment.
There are also a few encounters ascends for privacy preser-
vation, as the nodes are located adjacent to the end-users and
they can gather sensitive information [7].
1) Privacy dimensions: Fog computing is used to work
with sensitive information which is generated from several
sources. For securing these types of sensitive information,
privacy is one of the most significant problems in Fog com-
puting. There are lots of privacy issues that arise in the Fog
environment. In the following section, we are going to describe
Fog computing privacy issues from a different perspective:
• Users Privacy: usually Fog computing consists of a large
collection of IoT enabled devices which are connected
through sensor or wireless network. Therefore, IoT de-
vices are used to generate sensitive data at the user
level and upload it to Fog nodes for further processing.
Sensitive data such as personal data, home-automated
data, business data, health data, etc. By analyzing all this
sensitive information, an intruder can reveal a lot about
a user’s personal data and gain adequate knowledge.
• Data Privacy: as we already know that, Fog node works
at the edge plane of the network and it generally collects
sensitive data that is generated by various sensing and
end-user devices. Hence, Fog nodes are managed by
third parties. So, when all the unprocessed data are being
aggregated in the Fog layer, there might be a chance to
(compromise, alter, miss-match, etc) the data. Under such
circumstances, we need to indemnify the privacy of these
data. Usually, Fog nodes send requests to the end-users
to send their private data to them, in order to further
process it, store it temporarily, and finally, send data to
the cloud for permanent storage. Therefore, users will not
have control over the data where all the access and control
will be transferred to the Fog or cloud service providers.
Under such circumstances, service providers or malicious
insiders can manipulate the stored data. This signifies a
privacy issue to the user’s data.
• Usage Privacy: this privacy issue arises when a Fog
client can avail of the required Fog services. For example,
in a smart grid system, the reading of the smart meter
reveals masses of information of a smart-house such as
at the TV on and off time or when the home is vacant,
which certainly brings privacy breaches for users [58].
• Network Privacy: wireless connectivity is comprehen-
sive under the control of IoT as well as other edge devices
in a Fog computing environment. It is a big matter of
concern, as wireless connectivity is prone to network
privacy attacks. The maintenance cost is correlated with
the Fog nodes as it is positioned at the edge of the
Internet, where network configurations are established
manually [7]. The breaches private data which is an
important issue while using Fog networks. The end-users
share resources which contribute to Fog processing. Due
to this, information that is more sensitive is collected
by the Fog network as compared to a remote cloud. To
overcome these issues, an encryption scheme like HAN
(Home-Area Network) might be useful.
• Location Privacy: in the Fog environment, the location
privacy denotes to the protective techniques for breaches
related to the client’s location. While the client uploads its
responsibilities to the closest node, the uploaded node can
assume that the client is contiguous and far away from
other Fog processing devices. Therefore, if a client in the
Fog environment uses multiple Fog application services
from multiple locations, it may reveal its track directly to
the Fog nodes, to avoid collision amongst the Fog nodes.
As Fog nodes are vulnerable to potential attacks, It is
easy to compromise the privacy by having the location
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TABLE V
THE SUMMARY OF TRUST ISSUES IN FOG ENVIRONMENT FROM MAJOR SURVEY PAPERS
Reference Paper Highlights/Objectives Achievement and Limitation
Rauf et al. [11]
• Propose a risk-based trust model for the IoT
environment.
• Dynamic domain adaptive security solution.
• Parameters such as availability, reliability, re-
sponse time, etc. used.
• Direct and indirect observation also used for trust
computation.
• The system can compute trust as well as
compute risk levels of the system.
• Layer-wise Various attacks discussed.
• The system will provide trustworthy informa-
tion forwarding decision on the basis of trust
and risk values.
Wang et al. [53]
• Performed a Fog-based hierarchical trust mecha-
nism.
• Solve resource consumption problems.
• Able to monitor the trust state of the whole
network.
• Detect and recover data attacks and misjudgment
nodes respectively.
• Reduce consumption of the energy by the
network.
• Ensure the state of trust for network and edge
nodes.
• Detect some attacks of hidden data.
• Recover misjudgment nodes.
Rahman et al. [42]
• A broker based trust mechanism approach in Fog.
• Deliberate the trustworthy Fog service.
• Request matching algorithm has been used.
• Applies fuzzy logic for trust evaluation.
• Able to performed dynamic trust operation.
• Simultaneously maintained a trust relation-
ship.
Soleymani et
al. [52]
• Secure trust establishment among vehicles.
• Fuzzy trust scheme based on plausibility and
experience.
• Demonstrated a series of security checks.
• Can deal with uncertainties and risks.
• Detects faulty nodes and malicious attackers.
Yuan et al. [54]
• Reliable and lightweight trust evaluation mecha-
nism.
• More feasible against bad-mouthing attacks.
• Employ fusion of Multi-source feedback infor-
mation.
• Used objective information entropy theory.
• Suit for IoT edge computing on a large scale.
• Facilitates low-overhead trust computing al-
gorithms.
• Trust factors are weighted manually or sub-
jectively.
• Gained computational efficiency and reliabil-
ity.
Dang et al. [55]
• A data protection scheme has been for Fog com-
puting.
• Dynamic and can handle mobility management
service.
• Introducing Fog-based region verification and
privacy-aware role-based access control tech-
niques.
• Able to deliberate up-to-date location ser-
vices.
• Efficient and feasible scheme.
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credentials of the Fog clients. If the Fog clients are
attached to an object or a person, then the location privacy
is at risk. Whenever a Fog client frequently selects its
closest Fog node, the node can certainly identify if the
client is using the resources residing nearby.
2) Privacy Preservation: In Fog computing, it is used to
collect and process user personal data which is desirable. So,
it is evident that a proper privacy-preserving and security
mechanism is required to cope up with the Fog computing
environment. As we know, Fog computing consists of various
devices that are connected to IoT as well as Cloud. So, we
should apply privacy-preserving techniques between cloud and
Fog to maintain data privacy because both Fog and cloud
devices are resourceful and have adequate storage and power.
On the contrary, IoT devices have limited resources. So, it’s
a difficult task to implement privacy-preserving techniques
between the Fog and IoT devices. It is significant because the
users and users’ may be concerned about their data which
is sensitive [59]. Different privacy preservation techniques,
methods and schemes are proposed across many scenarios,
including cloud [60], wireless network [61], smart grid [62],
health-care systems [63], and online social network [64].
• Homomorphic encryption: There is a method for
privacy- preservation, which is homomorphic encryption
(it is a method for operating encrypted data without
decrypting it), that can be implemented to retain the
privacy of transmitted data without decryption across
local gateways [32].
• Differential privacy [65]: is to assure the privacy of ran-
dom individual entries in the statistical data set. Although
its computational overhead for such function is a big issue
in Fog computing, it needs to be assiduous about the
efficiency of the method.
• Identity obfuscation: There is a renowned technique
called identity obfuscation technique [66], where the
Fog node is able to recognize the Fog client is close
by, but it cannot recognize the Fog client. As such,
identity obfuscation is a technique for preserving location
privacy, as it has many methods inwardly. There is an
elementary method to preserve the location privacy of
the Fog client, whereby this client is allowed to upload
the data between diversified Fog nodes. This method
is not efficient, because it would waste Fog resources
and enhance the latency. As we already know, the Fog
client can choose its nearby Fog node to upload its data,
so the Fog node is able to identify that the Fog client
is residing nearby, which helps to get the Fog client’s
location credentials.
• Trusted third party: Wei et al. [66] demonstrated a
method, where a trusted third party (TTP) generated a
fraudulent ID for each Fog client. As a matter of fact,
it is not necessary that the Fog client has to choose a
node which is nearby, in spite of that it can choose any
nodes on the basis of a stipulated set of criteria such that
the reputation, latency or load balancing is not affected.
In this scenario, the Fog node can recognize the Fog
client’s rough location but cannot detect it exactly. In
addition, there could be a scenario whereby a Fog client
uses resources from multiple Fog nodes or the location of
the client can be squeezed into a small region. As such,
the location of the client must be within the coverage of
several Fog nodes. According to the described scenario,
the authors [67], used a method to preserve location
privacy.
• Data partitioning: Another probable method could be
effective for preserving user privacy by partitioning the
data into multiple Fog nodes. The usage pattern is another
privacy concern when clients are using Fog services. In
this scenario, privacy-preservation techniques have been
suggested in smart metering [68], [62], but we cannot ap-
ply these mechanisms in Fog computing directly, because
there is no TTP (i.e., smart meters in the smart grid) or no
backup device. The Fogging device can accumulate the
list of tasks for user usage. The creation of bogus tasks by
the clients and uploading them to multiple nodes is one
possible solution while hiding actual tasks from the bogus
ones. However, this solution may not be operational as it
raises the client’s expense and wastes resources.
According to the discussion above and based on different
criteria for privacy-preservation, it has summarized into the
Table VI.
C. Authentication in Fog Computing
Authentication helps to verify a user’s identity by verifying
if a user’s credentials match with the information in a database
via the authentication server. In the context of Fog computing,
authentication ensures and confirms an end user’s identity.
This helps ensure that only legitimate end users can have
access to the Fog nodes who have met all the requirements
to be authenticated as an end-user. Authentication is one of
the five pillars of Information Assurance (IA) [74]. In Fog
computing, authentication of the end user’s devices permitted
to Fog services is a significant requirement in the Fog network.
In order to obtain the Fog services from the Fog infrastructure,
an end user’s device must be authenticated to be a part
of the Fog processing infrastructure by authenticating itself.
Whereas it is also essential to defend against the access of
unauthorized entities. Fig. 5 shows the authentication issues
in Fog computing.
With the higher number of internet-enabled devices, au-
thentication is getting more and more vital to permit secure
communication for IoT applications and home automation.
Almost any object (entity) may be addressable and be ca-
pable to exchange information over the network. Thus, it is
significant to comprehend that each device or application can
be potentially an intrusion point in the environment. So, it is
mandatory to ensure a strong authentication mechanism for
each device or application in the Fog network system.
Although Fog computing eliminates many difficulties com-
pared to primitive cloud computing, it also provides excellent
services such as mobility, geo-distribution, heterogeneity, real-
time processing, etc. Similar to Cloud computing, Fog comput-
ing also faces new security challenges. Due to heterogeneity
and interaction of third party authorities in the Fog computing
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TABLE VI
THE SUMMARY OF PRIVACY ISSUES IN FOG ENVIRONMENT FROM MAJOR SURVEY PAPERS
Reference Paper Privacy Issues Highlights/Objectives Performances and Achievements
Wang et al. [69] Data Privacy,Identity Privacy
• Fog based public cloud computing.
• The idea of anonymity and secure aggre-
gation techniques used.
• Provide identity and data privacy.
• Performed pseudonyms and homomor-
phic encryption techniques.
• Performed computation and com-
munication effectively and effi-
ciently.
• Can save the communication
bandwidth.
Yang et al. [70]
Location privacy,
Location
verification
• Introduced secure positioning protocols
by preserving the location privacy.
• Position based advanced cryptographic
protocols have been introduced, which
preserve the location privacy.
• Privacy is gained without uti-
lizing additional computational
overhead.
• The system is as efficient and
quite practical in practice.
Kumar et al. [71] Location Privacy,Data Privacy
• Data confidentiality and location privacy
are focused on.
• Discussed how to access user data.
• The misconceptions about the rights of
users were discussed.
• The concept of a decoy method with
some incorporation for data and location
privacy.
• The concept of decoy method
for data and location privacy has
been discussed.
• Different attackers and their inter-
est in a user’s private data was
also discussed.
Liu et al. [72] Location privacy,Identity privacy
• Fog based vehicular ad-hoc network
(VANET)
• Secure and intelligent traffic light control
system using Fog.
• Location Based Encryption (LBE) and
Cryptographic computational DiffieHell-
man puzzle has been used.
• Reduce the computation and
communication overhead.
• Traffic light may efficiently verify
the authenticity of the vehicles.
• Fog device friendly and is able
to defend the Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack.
Lu et al. [73] Device Privacy,Data Privacy
• Employing lightweight privacy-
preserving data aggregation method,
for Fog and IoT systems.
• The homomorphic Paillier encryption,
Chinese Remainder Theorem, and one-
way hash chain techniques have been
applied.
• Performed efficiently and aggre-
gated hybrid IoT devices data into
one.
• Supported fault-tolerance(FT).
• Prevents false data injection at-
tack by filtering injected false
data at the network edge level.
• Computation and communication
costs are very low.
Qin et al. [61]
User’s privacy,
Network Privacy,
Data Privacy
• Preservation of the privacy of the end
user’s over a radio network.
• Techniques used include commitment
schemes along with zero-knowledge
proof and random-checking monitoring to
preserve the privacy of the end user and
to protect the data flow over the radio
network.
• Provides user’s privacy, data se-
curity and network privacy in the
Fog computing environment
• Efficiency and accuracy is un-
predictable in the Fog computing
environment.
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Fig. 5. Authentication issues arises in Fog Computing.
system, it leads to an increase in the scope of security breaches.
In such a case, there might occur various renowned attacks
(e.g. data loss, account traffic hijacking, man-in-the-middle
attack, denial of service attack, malicious insider attack, etc).
Therefore, it is a significant issue to think about secure Fog
networks by ensuring the security mechanism in every stage.
In that case, authentication plays a key role in protecting
the Fog network. Therefore, ensuring proper authentication
mechanisms would be a suitable solution to prevent such
attacks. As Fog computing is used to provides various services
with low latency and cooperate with the edge devices as well
as cloud systems, by providing any authentication mechanism,
there might be a chance to raise critical issues such as latency,
scalability and efficiency which needs to be handled according
to the demands of the Fog computing environment.
1) Authentication Factors in Fog computing: The authenti-
cation factor refers to attributes or data that can be considered
to authenticate user access to a system. A legacy security
system has a few authentication factors such as the knowledge
factor, which is something users know, the possession factor
which is something a user has and the inherent factor which
is something the user is. In recent years, other authentication
factors have been added - location factor and time factor, along
with the old authentication factor which are as follows:
• Knowledge Factor: the knowledge factor is any creden-
tials that consist of information that the user holds, such
as Username, Password, Personal Identification Number
(PIN) and answers to the secret questions [75].
• Authority Factor: the authority factor would be any
credentials that the user can own and carry with them,
such as hardware devices like a mobile phone or a
security token.
• Inherent Factor: the inherent factor is generally based
on biometric identification (fingerprints, facial, retina).
• Location Factor: the location factor itself cannot usually
refer to authentication, but it can be used with other
factors. For example, a legitimate user normally can
access a system from home or office in any organization’s
home country. An attacker will try to access that system
from a remote geographical location. With the help of a
location factor, the system can prevent illegitimate user
authentication into a system or network.
• Time factor: similar to the location factor, the time factor
can be used as a supplement with other factors. It can be
used together with the location factor. For example, an
authorized user can have access to a system in a specific
time period in an organization’s home country. On the
other hand, an illegitimate user tries to access that system
from a remote geographical location of another country.
Therefore, the authentication would be rejected based on
the time and location factor.
2) Authentication Measures in Fog Computing:
• Lack of Transparency: The existence of SLA between
a Fog or cloud service and an end users is a vital issue in
order to establish trust. Although many SLAs have clearly
defined the privacy over the user’s sensitive data, users are
unable to trust them in how the data is being governed.
Hence, the SLA verification gets limited when the service
is being directly used in the Fog layer by the end users
and a small organization, which should be monitored by
a licensed third-party through SLA verification. There
might be a lack of transparency that permits the users
to monitor their own data in the Fog or cloud system.
• Real-time Interaction: Fog nodes and end users interact
with a huge number of devices simultaneously. Different
services needs different authentication mechanisms where
if the process takes a huge time to authenticate, it would
be a challenging task with respect to real-time interaction.
• Latency and Scalability: In accordance with the rapid
growth of user devices and services, it is an ambitious
task to guarantee the efficiency of the authentication
mechanism. Whenever the latency of the authentication
process is high and incompatible with the service, scala-
bility is a big concern.
• The scope of Exploitation: In the context of Fog or cloud
system, there is a diversified authentication mechanism
for various services. These authentication methods can be
compromised or exploited by the attacker and the attacker
can appear to have gained administrative level access due
to the deficiency in the authentication mechanism. There
might be a chance to breach the security of data, devices
as well as the Fog network system.
3) Authentication Techniques in the Fog Environment:
Generally, users need to use various services simultaneously.
Therefore, they need to use different authentication methods
for different services where the performance of the authentica-
tion methods are different in the context of latency, efficiency
and scalability. On the other hand, the user faces lots of
difficulties to maintain access credentials for multiple services.
Authentication is the most significant issue for the security
and privacy of Fog computing. An authentication mechanism
that is not secure might cause harm for the cloud, Fog
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and end user’s devices, which is one of the main security
concerns for Fog computing [76] as well. Therefore, different
authentication techniques have been proposed for elevating
security mechanisms in the Fog or cloud computing, but each
authentication method has come up with its own dominance
and limitations. In this subsection, a few traditional authenti-
cation techniques and their limitations as well as drawbacks
according to the Fog environment has been described. We also
described a few proposed solutions which meets with the Fog
computing criteria.
• Password Based Authentication: In password authen-
tication, the user must first give a password for every
service, and the system administrator must keep track
of all usernames and passwords on the server. Password
Authentication is performed by accepting a key and pass-
word for allowing a user into local and remote systems.
Password authentication can be categorized depending
on its strength as weak authentication, stronger authenti-
cation, and inconvenient authentication [77]. Therefore,
password-based authentication has several applications
and it is deployed in cloud computing [78] [79] [80], but
it will face numerous drawbacks and limitations when it
is considered for Fog computing:
– It takes an extensive computation to process. it’s
challenging due to the limited end device resources.
– In the Fog network, end users frequently commu-
nicate with various Fog nodes from different Fog
environment. Therefore, it is inappropriate to keep a
password for each Fog node. In addition, it is not a
good concept to set the most used password for each
Fog node.
– Usually, a password does not provide high secu-
rity because of numerous attacks [81], for example,
vulnerability to off-line dictionary attacks.
• PKI Based Authentication: public key infrastructure
(PKI) based authentication creates and upholds a reliable
networking environment by offering certificate and key
management services that permit encryption and digital
signature abilities between applications all in a way that
is transparent and easy to use. PKI offers confidentiality,
authentication, integrity (CIA) and non-repudiation of
the exchanged messages. In [12], the authors described
security issues and focused on authentication issues at
various levels of the Fog computing environment. There-
fore, the traditional PKI-based authentication scheme is
not effective in the context of Fog computing due to the
poor scalability. In addition, the allocation of public keys
can be weighty due to the enormous scale of Fog nodes
and end users. Another drawback is that, if the private
keys cannot be well preserved, the security will be ruined.
On the other hand, the Diffie-Hellman [82] key exchange
based authentication scheme is not compatible with the Fog
environment due to its slow and extensive computations.
Balfanz et al. [83] demonstrated a user-friendly, cheap
and secure method to resolve the authentication issue for a
wireless networks based on pre-authentication of location-
limited channel. Likewise, Nearfield communication (NFC) is
used in Cloudlet to simplify the authentication process [84].
Ibrahim et el. [85] proposed a secure mutual authentication
method for the Fog environment, that allows authenticating
any Fog user with the Fog nodes mutually in the Fog network.
The authors [86] proposed a method based on the multi-Tier
authentication scheme to Secure Login in Fog Computing.
The authors [87] mentioned that Advance Encryption Standard
(AES) is a compatible encryption algorithm for the Fog
computing environment as it needs low hardware resources
and fewer computations. The authors [76] demonstrated that
the end user devices can initiate spoofing attacks and are
prone to data tampering which can be preserved with the
aid of PKI, DiffeHellman key exchange and monitoring by
Intrusion detection techniques. Finally, the authors adviced
that the chances of such attacks can be prevented by deploying
a secure authentication mechanism between the Fog platform
and the end users.
• Biometric Authentication: is a technique of user identity
verification based on various biological inputs through
scanning or analysis of some parts of the body. Biometric
scanners scanning a user’s physical biometric characteris-
tics such as fingerprint, voice recognition, iris scan, face
recognition, etc. Generally, biometric authentication takes
place to manage access to digital or physical resources.
Biometric authentication is an upcoming technology and
is already rapidly deployed in mobile computing as well
as cloud computing using fingerprint authentication, face
authentication, keystroke-based authentication or touch-
based authentication [7]. On the other hand, biometric
authentication techniques comparatively take a huge ex-
ecution time and its security level remains constrained
when high-level security is required [85]. Therefore, in
accordance with the Fog computing environment, apply-
ing biometric-based authentication techniques would be a
suitable solution. Although still, it has a lot of limitations
and drawbacks - it takes more computational time during
the process of execution and it provides constrained
levels of security when high-level security is required.
Therefore, to consider biometric based authentication for
Fog computing is still a research issue [7].
In accordance with the study above, and based on different
issues of authentication, this has been summarized in Table
VII.
D. Access Control in Fog
Access control is a method of restrictive access to a system
or to a physical or virtual resource. In computing, it is
defined as a process by which users are granted privileges
for retrieving information from the system, information or
resources. In access control systems, individuals must have
legitimate credentials before access can be granted to them.
The process of access control is shown in Fig. 6
By deploying Access Control in the Fog network system,
it would be possible to conserve a user’s privacy and assure
both the user and system security maintain trust between the
Fog, cloud service providers and users. The authors in [95]
highlighted a few Access Control (AC) problems in the area
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TABLE VII
THE SUMMARY OF AUTHENTICATION ISSUE IN FOG ENVIRONMENT FROM MAJOR SURVEY PAPERS
Reference Paper Highlights/Objectives Performances and Achievements
Ibrahim et al. [85]
• An efficient and secure mutual authentication
method for the cloud-Fog-edge system architec-
ture.
• Required to store one master secret key.
• Does not need extra overheads such as re-
initialization or re-registration process.
• Required to perform fewer hash invocations
and symmetric encryptions/decryptions.
• In addition, simple countermeasures have
been introduced.
• Suitable and can be deployed efficiently to
the Fog user’s smart device/card.
Wazid et al. [88]
• Fog devices security can be ensured through key
management and authentication schemes.
• Performed efficient and lightweight operations.
• Bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) and One-way cryp-
tographic hash function techniques have been
considered.
• Demonstrated using formal security verification.
• Performed low computation and communica-
tion overheads.
• Ensure high security compare to another ex-
isting method.
Dsouza et al. [89]
• Introduce a policy-based resources management
in Fog network.
• Support interoperability and secure collaboration
among various resources in Fog system.
• Server authentication, device authentication,
data migration authentication and instance
authentication has been observed for the se-
cured Fog computing environment.
Alharbi et al. [90]
• Ensure secure communications among the vari-
ous IoT devices.
• Performed challenge-response authentication
technique.
• Performed effectively and efficiently.
• It can achieve very low response latency.
• Protects the IoT system from DDoS attacks.
Amor et al. [91]
• Introduces anonymous mutual-authentication
amongst the Fog users and Fog servers.
• Cryptographic and mathematical have been per-
formed to establish the session key.
• Can accomplish effectively and efficiently
and improved the security and privacy in Fog
network.
• Can defend against various attacks such as
man-in-the-middle attack, eavesdropping and
reply attacks.
Hu et al. [92]
• Highlighted privacy-preservation and security
methods for Fog based image processing appli-
cations.
• Data encryption, the authentication and session
key agreement, and data integrity checking such
methods have been proposed.
• Can perform effectively and solve the issues
of integrity, availability, and confidentiality.
• Increases a little computation and communi-
cation overhead.
Ha et al. [93]
• An efficient and elliptic cryptographic based
mutual-authentication technique for an IoT based
resource constrained devices.
• Uses Implicit certificate and key management for
secure communication and mutual authentication.
• Achieved less execution time.
• Suitable for resource constrained devices.
Gope et al. [94]
• Deliberated two-factor lightweight and privacy-
preserving authentication method for resource
constrained IoT devices.
• Provide resilient way of authentication.
• Very efficient computational capacity.
• Can performed robustly against malicious at-
tacks.
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Fig. 6. A Process of Access Control (AC).
of Fog computing and classified these problems into the
following types:
• The users should be authenticated by the Fog or cloud
system if they wanted to use the services such as storage
or computation, where several strategies must be used to
control access for both services and data as well.
• Security management is difficult to control, given the
number of requirements.
• The cloud and Fog system needs mutual access control.
• Access control mechanism helps to prevent attacks such
as side-channel in Virtual machines (VMs).
• Resources are very limited to both the user and Fog
devices respectively.
1) Access Control Models: Access control is the best meth-
ods to achieve preservation within the networks, devices and
systems. While it helps user’s admittance in the system, access
control also supports efficient data protection from various
kinds of adversaries. Conventionally, access control models
(ACM) are categorized [96] into the following forms.
• Discretionary access control (DAC): the object’s owner
elects access permissions to others. These models are
typically used in traditional applications of cloud and
suffers from significant overhead costs in managing the
multi-user environment. The second category abstract
requires the need of resource-user mapping. So, compared
to DAC models, this model is more flexible for distributed
systems.
• Mandatory access control (MAC): The MAC models
use multi-level security systems. Here, the administrator
of the system decides who has access to the system. In
a multi-level MAC model, both objects and subjects are
recognized with a security level classification (i.e. top
secret, secret, classified, and unclassified). The nature
of Fog/cloud computing is outsourced, hence there is a
need to focus on access control models which can be
effectively applied in this computing environment.
• Role Based Model (RBAC): Designing a model for
access control is a rudimentary challenge in a large scale
to secure mobile distributed applications and database
systems as there is a need to provide dynamic privileges
for checking systems in the environment. RBAC is a
fined grain model that offers more benefits compared
to previous models [97], such as regulating the user’s
access to applications and resources by identifying the
activities and the roles of users in the system [98]. RBAC
authorizes the subject based on their responsibilities and
roles of individual users within the Fog-cloud computing
environment [99] [96] [95] [100]. Roles may vary from
subject (user) to subject (user). That means in this model,
the responsibility of a subject is more vital than the
subject itself [101], [99].
Limitations and Drawbacks of the RBAC Model:
– The RBAC model had been developed for allocating
user permissions statically.
– It does not consider contextual information (e.g. lo-
cation, time, device constrains) and dynamic/random
behavior of users.
– It cannot cope with dynamic segregation of duties.
– It is coarse-grained. If you have a role called ad-
ministrator, then you would assign the administrator
role permission to “View employee record” (i.e it
has permissions to see all the records of employed)
which denotes as an expansion of the role.
– It ignores meta-data of resources e.g. employee own-
ers record.
– It is hard to manage and maintain within a large
administrative domain.
– Access reviews are painful, error-prone and lengthy.
– Permissions accompanying each role change or
delete is based on the change of the role.
Therefore, RBAC in Fog, should ensure quicker granting
access permissions and minimize the above-mentioned
limitations and drawbacks.
• Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC): This model
is one of the latest methods of managing authoriza-
tion. It is a talented alternative to conventional access
control techniques and has attracted consideration from
both academia and the industry. Comparatively, recent
developments of ABAC still leaves several unknown
difficulties such as delegation, administration, auditability
and scalability.
• Attribute Based Encryption (ABE): This model is an
encryption-based Access Control model and best suits ac-
cess control problems in the Fog-cloud environment. The
Attribute-Based Encryption(ABE) [102] method catego-
rized into two types. firstly, the encryption is based on the
key policy which is known as key policy attribute based
encryption (KP-ABE) [103] and secondly, the encryption
is based on Cipher-text policy which is known as Cipher-
text policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) [104].
This model can preserve data privacy and enable data
owners to define a desirable set of policies directly [95].
– Key Policy Attribute-based Encryption (KP-
ABE): Goyal et al. [103] proposed KP-ABE in the
year 2006, based on the classical ABE model and
uses one of many communications. This technique
achieves fine-grained access control with higher elas-
ticity to control individuals compared to the tradi-
tional scheme [97].
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– Cipher-text Policy Attribute-based Encryption
(CP-ABE): CP-ABE [104] was introduced as an-
other alternative form of ABE. CP-ABE can provide
fine-grained and reliable access control for cloud
storage environment that is not trust worthy. Users
can access data only if their attributes match the
access policies associated with the data. CP-ABE
works in a reverse compared to KP-ABE. In this,
the key generated is attribute user set, where the
cipher text is fixed by access policy [97]. However,
CPABE has two main drawbacks [105]: policies are
not explained using standard languages and it cannot
support non-monotonic policies.
Architecture of ABE : The architecture of the ABE
method is categorized as centralized and decentralized
as well as hierarchical [100].
– Centralized: In a centralized architecture, the keys
will be served by a central authority center for the
users.
– Decentralized: In a decentralized architecture, the
information will be shared by multi-authorized au-
thorities based on the policies of various organiza-
tions.
– Hierarchical: In hierarchical architecture, the scal-
ability and flexibility is enhanced and assists the
features of one-to-many encryption for the users.
Revocation Types of ABE: The revocation types are
categorized into two types: attribute revocation and user
revocation.
– Attribute Revocation (AR): by using the AR mech-
anism, the attribute from the user’s attributes list will
be removed by the revocation controller unit.
– User Revocation (UR): by using the UR mecha-
nism, a user restricts data access via the revocation
controller unit.
Revocation Method: There are various revocation meth-
ods to revoke a user and attributes using the ABE method.
Proxy re-encryption, time re-keying, an update key, lazy
revocation and LSSS matrix are the primary revocation
methods.
Revocation Issue: Deploying the ABE method in cloud
storage systems to control data access brings about for-
ward and backward revocation issues.
Revocation Controller: The revocation controller is
someone who is designated to execute the user or the
attribute revocation method. In general, the owner of data
revokes the attributes or the user but the data owner is
able to confer the revocation duties to the server or the
authorized entity.
Limitations and Drawbacks of ABE Based Model: :
As we mentioned before, Fog computing extends cloud
and the functionalities as well as the requirements of
Fog computing, which are unique. So, the access control
structure of cloud computing is not able to directly
meet the requirements of Fog computing. However, re-
searchers [76] [106] recommended that ABE techniques
suits Fog computing, but still needs to improve and
meet some criteria such as fine-grained, cryptographi-
cally enforces, latency and policy management problems
which needs to be re-thought and considered for further
research. Although the end device or user device in Fog
computing is constrained resources. Therefore, there is
no need for deploying data encryption-decryption and
access control mechanisms at the user level. Because the
Fog devices are resourceful and used close to the end-
user devices. Based on these circumstances, outsourcing
access control methods would be the more appropriate
solution for Fog computing. On the other hand, as we
know already, Fog computing consists of a dynamic
environment. Therefore, the ABE-based access control
should support creating, updating, and revoking the user
attributes and access structures with the management of
the access policies according to the dynamic behavior of
Fog computing [95].
2) Issues and Requirements for Access Control in Fog
Computing: To establish and ensure secure and efficient access
control, policies must ensure confidentiality, accountability
and integrity. However, due to the nature of the Fog computing
environment, one should consider a few things to build a
secure and strong Access Control (AC) [95] [107] which are
as follows:
• Computation and Communication Latency: it indi-
cates how long it takes for a single packet to travel
from one designated node to another node. The sender
considers sometimes latency as the time for sending a
packet and getting an acknowledgement from the sender,
where the round-trip time is taken as latency. As Fog
computing is renowned for its faster accessibility, we
need to ensure low-latency for providing smooth services
to the end users. We can indemnify the low-latency during
processing time so that the access decision can transpire
within a reasonable time.
• Efficiency: efficiency is also correlated to latency. In Fog
computing, there are two types of devices e.g. resource
rich (Smart Power Grid, Smart City, Smart Transportation
System, E-Health etc.) and resource constrained (mobile
phone, smart-watch, smart-glass, etc.). The proper imple-
mentation of Access Control System in Fog computing is
still a challenging issue because of it’s low efficiency. If
the low efficiency occurs in a continuous manner, it can
result in undesirable latency, which can affects the other
parts of the network.
• Generality: with the distinction of hardware and soft-
ware, we need to generalize all the systems and services
of Fog computing.
• Data Aggregation: in Fog computing, users are geo-
spatially distributed where Fog devices are used to collect
data from user devices. Therefore, it is necessary to
accumulate all Fog devices closer to the end users for re-
ducing latency. The data generated from user devices will
be meaningful or meaningless but it should be handled
intelligently and evenly. During the whole aggregation
process, authority changes are a critical issue for data
access control.
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• Privacy Desecration: as it is possible to exchange data
between one domain to another domain, administration of
the decentralized architecture of Fog computing leads us
to protect the privacy of data through Fog access control.
So, it becomes a critical requirement to protect the user’s
data privacy.
• Network Availability: in Fog computing, network avail-
ability must be defined in such a way that when there
is an issue of network unavailability, access control can
also deliver the predefined level of functionality.
• Context Awareness: when multiple operations like cap-
turing, transferring, processing and storing are running,
access control decisions should be managed competently
to support all the contextual information (e.g. health
condition, weather condition, temperature, time, traffic
condition, etc.) [81].
• Scalability: scalability is to facilitate the services accord-
ing to the needs of the end users. In access control,
scalability will provide the services that can grow or
shrink according to the end user’s level of capacity.
For scalability, the CloudPolice [108] have proposed a
distributed solution, in which hypervisors are responsible
for the communication with each other to install access
control states.
• Resource Restriction/Constraints: in Fog computing,
the user or the edge resources are limited. So, it becomes
tough to implement access control for Fog computing.
• Policy Management: it is an integral part of Fog com-
puting architecture. So, the access control model needs to
be capable to support creating, invoking, releasing, and
deleting policy management. Dsouza et al. [89] developed
a policy-driven security management framework, which
is capable to support secure communication and resource
sharing in the Fog environment.
• Accountability: in Fog computing, it is significant to
keep track of the suspicious activities of intruders. These
tracks keeping should be handled intuitively across the
administrative domains.
3) Access Control Domains: : In the Fog computing arena,
for defining access control system the contextual domains are
1. Fog to Edge, 2. Fog to Fog, 3. Fog to Cloud. While edge
devices are communicating and sending data to Fog devices
during the time that the Fog device uses to process all the
data in such a way, so that, if the necessity arises, it can
send all the processed data to the nearest Fog devices. When
the issues for storing data arise permanently, Fog devices
are able to send all the data to a data warehouse or cloud
storage. Therefore, process/store identity and access data in
the Fog/cloud computing by first ensuring secure Fog/cloud
access control. Ensuring access control in the cloud/Fog envi-
ronment is a crucial technique to enhances the user security.
In this scenario, end-user/data privacy, faster communication
and computation, network and communication security, etc.
Such requirements shall be applied for the above-mentioned
domains to enable the proper access control system. For this,
all the primordial access control models are being advanced
accordingly.
In accordance with the above study, and based on different
access control method, it has been summarized into Table VIII.
E. Malicious Attacks and Threats in Fog Computing
Due to the isolated deployment of Fog nodes in some
places, it fails to protect countermeasures and surveillances.
As a result, it is very easy for intruders or malicious attackers
to compromise the Fog networks through several malicious
attacks [115]. For example, a malicious user can compromise
a Fog node with its own generated trust values, smart meter,
smart grid, traffic system or spoof IP addresses [12] to
ruin sensitive information. In this segment, we will give an
overview of these potential threats and attacks issues.
1) Potential Threats:
• Rogue Fog Node: Rouge Fog node is a one type of
Fog device in Fog computing environment which presents
itself as a legitimate node and persuades end users to
connect with it. It may happen in such a scenario,
when a Fog administrator instantiates an insider attack,
to identify the rogue Fog node or legitimate Fog node.
Stojmenovic et al. [12] have proven that the data can be
tampered by a man-in-the-middle attack, with updated
or collected the data either in the Fog layer or cloud
layer. There is also the possibility to launch additional
attacks. So, in the context of privacy and security, the
presence of a rogue Fog node will be a potential threat
in the Fog environment. It is not easy to detect a rogue
Fog node in Fog computing for various reasons. One
of the main reasons is the diversified trust computing
mechanism which brings about perplexed trust situations.
On the other hand, we know that Fog computing is
dynamic in nature, and consists of numerous devices
which leads to creating, deleting, and revoking simul-
taneously. Therefore, for these various instances, it is
difficult to manage the blacklisted nodes. The authors
Han et al. [116] [117] have demonstrated measurement-
based models which permit a client to escape connecting
to rouge access points (AP). Ma et al. [118] introduced
a framework to identify the existence of rogue APs in
wireless networks. Detecting a rogue Fog node in an
IoT network is cumbersome because of the network
complexity across different scenarios [10]. Nevertheless,
by using trust measurement-based models in the IoT
network, it helps to detect rogue nodes. Although this
method is not adequate, it can be considered for limited
security protection.
• Fault Tolerance: Fog computing is an emerging dis-
tributed computing platform which consists of a huge
collection of numerous devices which is widely geo-
distributed and heterogeneous. Therefore, there might be
high chance of failure of devices, as compared to cloud
computing. Fog computing is dynamic in nature, whereby
the Fog nodes or IoT devices connects or disconnects
to a Fog layer over and over. Because of this behavior,
there might be a chance to bring about unexpected
faults and failures in the Fog environment. Therefore, in
these circumstances, the Fog computing platform should
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TABLE VIII
THE SUMMARY OF ACCESS CONTROL ISSUE IN THE FOG ENVIRONMENT ACROSS MAJOR SURVEY PAPERS
Reference Paper Highlights/Objectives Performances and Achievements
Zhang et al. [109]
• A promising CP-ABE based access control for a
Fog computing environment.
• Outsourcing and attribute update capability.
• Encryption and decryption are outsourced.
• Perform heavy computation operations of en-
cryption and decryption within a very small
and constant time period.
• Less computation cost and efficient attribute
update.
• Suitable for resource-constrained IoT de-
vices.
Vohra et al. [97]
• Fog based decentralized Multi-Authority attribute
based data access control.
• Also based on CP-ABE method.
• Performs fast offline-online encryption and par-
tial decryption method.
• Secure and performs effectively and effi-
ciently.
• Ensures secure communication from un-
trusted devices on the Fog network.
• Achieved authentication, access control, ver-
ifiability and confidentiality.
Popa et al. [110]
• A distributed multi-tenancy approach access con-
trol.
• Access control only suits in infrastructure levels
- as physical hosts and hypervisors.
• Simpler, scalable and robust techniques.
• Requires extra processing power.
Fan et al. [111]
• CP-ABE based multi-authority data access con-
trol scheme in Fog-cloud computing systems.
• Outsourced encryption and decryption computa-
tions.
• User and attribute revocation can be per-
formed efficiently.
• Secure and highly efficient scheme.
Xiao et al. [112]
• A hybrid and fine-grained access control solution.
• Most of the decryption process can be out-
sourced.
• Secure and suitable in the Fog computing envi-
ronment.
• Perfectly applicable for resource-constrained IoT
devices and applications.
• Efficiency of data access is improved.
• Key management cost is greatly reduced.
• The limitation and drawbacks of this method
is it can be applied only in centralized archi-
tecture.
Yu et al. [113]
• Fine-grained access control and privacy is pro-
vided for Fog computing.
• Can also guarantee security across side channel
attacks.
• leakage-resilient functional encryptions frame-
work have been developed.
• Highly secured and fine-grained access con-
trol.
• Fully secure leakage-resilient functional en-
cryption schemes have been presented.
Zaghdoudi et
al. [114]
• Access control mechanisms proposed for Fog
computing and ad-hoc MCC.
• Focused on measuring the system overhead with
different metrics.
• A different size of networks, different hash func-
tion, and a variable responsible nodes percentage
such metrics considered.
• A generic access control solution with fea-
tures robust and scalable.
• Take overhead with the increase of nodes in
the network.
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provide all the necessary services without interruption
if there is a failure occur in individual Fog devices,
networks, applications, and services platforms [119]. Be-
cause Fog applications should be capable to instantly
turn to other available nodes via some inbuilt mechanism
if the services in an area become unusual. To mitigate
these issues, standards should be applied. Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is such example that can
deal with such events and packet reliability in wireless
sensor networks [120].
In general, fault tolerance ensures the availability of
devices or applications in the event of a failure to
provide uninterrupted services. Nevertheless, on the basis
of what service is being used, fault tolerance will change
according to one’s role and management privileges. In the
cloud computing environment, fault tolerance is handled
by applying three techniques - proactive, reactive and
adaptive [121].
Proactive fault tolerance policies refer to an escape res-
cue from faulty components by anticipating and replacing
the failed components before it takes place.
Reactive fault tolerance policies refer to the decrease
in the influence of faulty components when the failure
occurs. In Adaptive fault tolerance, where the procedure
is carried out according to the situation automatically.
There are numerous fault tolerance techniques which
are often used in computing [122] [123] [124] such
as Replication, Job Migration, checkpoint, self-healing,
Rescue workflow, Safety-bag checks, Task Resubmis-
sion, Software Rejuvenation, Masking, Preemptive Mi-
gration, and Resource Co-allocation. Nevertheless, in
this paper, fault tolerance is mostly discussed based
on the cloud computing environment as Fog comput-
ing is a new computing paradigm. In recent research
works [125] [126] [127] [128] [129], the context of cloud
computing in such a scenario was discussed. Therefore,
fault tolerance in Fog computing is still a research task.
In order to provide a reliable and robust Fog comput-
ing environment, failure handling of services should be
effectively considered.
2) Malicious Attacks: Fog computing comprises various
IoT or edge devices and collects the data from these de-
vices by accomplishing latency conscious processes. Identi-
fying malicious nodes is a complex task in the Fog envi-
ronment [130]. As we know, Fog computing is a miniature
of cloud computing, as such, almost all types of malicious
attacks, which affected a cloud environment can also affect
Fog computing. For Example DDoS (Distributed Denial of
Service), MITM, sniffing, side channel attacks, DoS (Denial of
Service), malware injection, and authentication attacks attack
are few of them. Therefore, in these circumstances, without
an appropriate prevention mechanism, it can severely damage
the competency of the Fog system or network. In this portion,
we are going to expose a few malicious attacks which might
occur frequently and affect the Fog environment.
• Attacks from malicious Fog nodes and edge devices:
As Fog nodes are compromised easily by any malicious
attacker, it is a very serious and potential threat for
the Fog network environment. The authors [31] mention
various unique security threats in their research, which
might occur in the IoT and Fog environments. For de-
livering services to the users, the received data from the
IoT devices will be processed by Fog nodes. If some
Fog nodes are compromised by any intruders, it is a
problematic task to ensure the security of the data. One
possible solution would be, by establishing trust between
Fog nodes themselves. In this case, an authentication
mechanism is mandatory for ensuring secure, trusted
communication. Therefore, Fog nodes cannot manage
each other, so that it needs to trust only the cloud for
authenticity. Sequentially, after being authenticated by the
cloud, it should be placed in a Fog environment to process
heavy data. However, they are not able to give a suitable
solution for this attack. Li et al. [131], carried out research
and presented a solution.
It is vital to identify malicious Fog devices in Fog
computing. Due to the lack of resource and edge devices,
it is difficult to deploy proper authorization mechanisms
between Fog nodes and edge devices. So, it is hard to
prevent all attacks completely because of granting a few
privileges and processing of the data. Sohal et al. [132]
tried to solve the problem by using intrusion detection
and virtual honeypot devices by introducing a Markov
chain based framework.
• Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack: All data traffic
passing through is protected through secure transmission
channels between Fog nodes and edge devices in Fog
computing. During this communication process, a user’s
data will be snooped or impersonated by an external
malicious attacker prior to performing a global concealing
process in the Fog node. Such a scenario correlates
with the MITM attack. In a MITM attack, a perpetrator
secretly relays and manipulates the data during commu-
nication between two parties. Hence, MITM is a potential
attack method which can be used as a typical attack in
Fog computing. In Fog computing, an attacker can carry
out sniffing or disrupt the packets between Fog devices.
As mentioned earlier, in Fog computing, all devices are
resource constrained. By having this problem, it is be-
comes a challenging task to deploy secure communication
protocols and encryption-decryption methods amongst
Fog nodes and IoT devices [76]. Stojmenovic et al. [76]
proposed an authentication method which can possibly
avoid MITM attack. To mitigate MITM attacks, the
anomaly detection is hardly applicable in Fog computing
because these methods were being used in traditional
cloud computing. Therefore, to mitigate MITM attacks
in Fog computing, a compatible solution still offers a
challenge, which can be considered for further research.
• Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS): In the
modern epoch, Distributed Denial of Service or (DDoS)
is one of the most renowned and challenging threats
for cyberspace and other online services. As Fog nodes
are made up of limited resources, it is troublesome to
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manage a huge amount of requests simultaneously. When
a malicious attacker or intruder initiates a bunch of inap-
propriate service requests towards the targeted device, or
tries to spoof multiple devices concurrently using the IP
addresses, the Fog node will be occupied for a longer
span of time. Therefore, all the legitimate services of
Fog devices will be inaccessible for legitimate users.
As opposed to, Fog nodes which go on to compromise
themselves and get used for generating DDoS attacks. A
different plane of the Fog environment can be affected
by this kind of attack. Recently, malicious attackers have
been able to compromise online home-automated smart
devices to execute a DDoS attack against popular online
websites such as Twitter, Paypal and Reddit. After these
attacks, all of these websites were severely affected.
Hackers have been trying to use internet-connected home
automated equipment, such as Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) cameras, printers, refrigerator, etc. to perform
DDoS attacks on popular websites, such as Twitter,
Spotify, PayPal, SoundCloud and Reddit [133] [134]. In
accordance with the Fog network system, all smart ob-
jects which are connected consists of more computational
power and they have the ability to perform various tasks
concurrently. As compared to traditional DDoS attacks, in
Fog computing, various Fog devices apply DDoS attacks
which will become much more severe. Therefore, it is not
possible to mitigate a DDoS attack completely in the Fog
computing environment. At the present moment, we can
only monitor them. Under these circumstances, current
DDoS issues may need new thinking and further research
which will classify DDoS issue much more precisely in
the context of the Fog computing environment.
• Malicious Insider Data Theft Attack: According to
the three-plane architecture of Fog computing, cloud
computing is correlated to Fog computing. Hence, we
should be conscious of all the malicious attacks which
occur in cloud computing frequently. One severe attack
in cloud computing could be a malicious insider attack
for data theft purposes. On common terms, the end users
will have to trust the cloud service provider despite being
aware of this threat. It happens due to the deficiency
of cloud service provider’s authentication, authorization,
and audit controls which allows attacks to spread out
across the cloud system. In this regard, a few incidents
have occurred which compromised corporate data, for
example, Twitter’s personal hacking [135], [136] as
well as the account hacking incident of U.S. President
Barack Obama [137] which was exposed as a malicious
intent to steal a user’s credentials. The authors Rocha et
al. [138] revealed that a malicious insider can gain access
to the user’s data easily in a cloud computing system.
The attackers carry out their attacks which are generated
from within cloud service providers. Therefore, the end
user is not able to detect unauthorized access. There are
diversified approaches which would be useful in order to
secure data from faulty implementation, misconfigured
service bugs in code by using encryption and access
control to restrict them as well as to give protection from
sophisticated attacks [139]. Another solution could be
user behavior profiling, where the system keeps track of
the amount of user data access and the duration of data
use. Hence, the system can identify anomalous activities
of end users, which can be used to detect malicious
attacks. In this case, the authors Stolfo et al. [140] have
proposed a new approach to assure the security of cloud
computing by using user behavior profiling and decoy
technology. There might still be few issues [45] which
arise, on how to deploy the decoy in Fog networks
and how to develop an on-demand decoy information to
reduce the portion of stolen data from being lost.
• Physical Attacks: In traditional data centers, physical
security is being provided by on site security staff. On
the other hand, by applying complex measures e.g. card
punch, thumb impression, and retina scanning, physical
access control can be deployed much more convincingly.
So, these issues are related to certification and audits to
derive the necessary physical security measures which are
required to meet the set standards. Basically, Fog nodes
are widely distributed across various environments. Due
to point, it is impossible to implement traditional physical
security measures in the Fog computing environment. For
example, physical security measures can be applicable to
place the edge box at the top of the streetlight’s pole,
which should be hidden from eye level as well as being
surrounded with a fire-resistant coating to keep it safe
from vandalism. There is a lower probability of physical
attacks at the software level which enables the scope of
theoretical attacks.
In accordance with the study above, and based on different
issues regarding threats and attacks related to the Fog, it can be
summarized in Table IX. The focus of this study is to address
auditing issues to secure the Fog computing environment. The
following section discusses security auditing issues in Fog.
F. Security Auditing in Fog
In the traditional computing environment, it is often es-
sential for technology experts to perform various security
tasks such as examining security configurations, regulating
potential vulnerabilities and constructing new security config-
urations with respect to every organization’s own security poli-
cies [145]. On the other hand, it is getting much harder when
new computing paradigms like Fog computing are considered.
Traditionally, organizations can enforce their access control
policies according to its employee’s roles and responsibilities,
which is actually a challenging task for most administrators.
Therefore, this challenge will be much more difficult in a
Fog computing environment where security policies can be
deployed across a huge number of devices residing at the edges
of the Fog network. Security administrators need adequate
knowledge to accomplish multifarious administrative tasks.
Therefore, in this section, we discuss the various issues of
Fog computing security auditing.
Why is security auditing important for Fog?
Fog computing is the latest computing paradigm in the modern
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TABLE IX
THE SUMMARY OF THREATS AND ATTACKS ISSUES IN FOG ENVIRONMENT FROM MAJOR SURVEY PAPERS
Reference Paper Highlights/Objectives Achievement and Limitation
Stojmenovic et
al. [76]
• Managed to conduct a MITM attack.
• This attack is very stealthy and dangerous.
• An authentication scheme has been proposed
to mitigate such attacks.
• Encrypted communication method may not
work always to protect from this kind of
attacks.
• On the other hand, complex encryption and
decryption techniques are not always compat-
ible due to resource limitation.
Wang et al. [141]
• Fog based storage technology to mitigate the
cyber threat in the cloud.
• Data stored separately in the Fog server as well
as in the cloud storage.
• Ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability of data.
• Attackers unable to get any information about
data by using data fragment.
• Can protect the confidentiality of the user’s
data better than traditional ways.
• This approach is safe and feasible for cloud
storage.
Homayoun et
al. [142]
• Fully automated and Fog node ransomware de-
tection techniques for the Fog layer.
• Deep learning techniques can be applied.
• Detect and identify the ransomware within
very short time execution of an application.
Han et al. [116],
[117]
• The presence of fake Fog nodes or rogue Fog
nodes is a serious threat to the Fog network.
• A practical, timing based method for the end
users to avoid connecting to rogue Access
Point.
Stolfo et al. [140] • Decoy technology and user behavior profiling
have been used for disguise detection.
• Mitigating insider data theft attacks.
• Securing personal and business data.
Sandhu et al. [130]
• A framework which uses three technologies such
as an IDS, a Markov model, and a virtual hon-
eypot device (VHD).
• Edge device classification depends on level of
damage and frequency of attacks.
• Proposed system is able to identify malicious
Fog nodes in Fog.
• Successfully identify the malicious devices
and also decreases IDS false alarm rates of
IDS.
Hosseinpour et
al. [143]
• Lightweight and distributed IDS system based on
an Artificial Immune System (AIS).
• Three-layered structure that includes the Fog,
cloud, and edge layers.
• Smart data approach has been used to build
a lightweight and efficient IDS for the Fog
platform.
• Can detect silent attacks such as botnet at-
tacks in IoT-based systems.
Alharbi et al. [144]
• Security system based on Fog that defends the
IoT system from malware attacks.
• Proposed challenge-response authentication to
protect IoT systems from further from DDoS
attacks.
• Able to filter malicious attacks effectively
while response latency is very low and net-
work bandwidth consumption is low.
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Fig. 7. Life cycle of Security.
computing world. The life cycle of security is shown in Fig. 7.
The risk level from user to system is shown in Fig. 8. In spite
of its substantial growth, there still remains lots of barriers for
much more widespread adopting of Fog computing services
due to security issues. Lack of auditability is a primary security
concern in the Fog computing environment.
In the following section, we discuss several key aspects of
Fog security auditing.
Why is traditional security auditing not enough for the
Fog?
Fog computing has come up with numerous features and it is
strongly dynamic in nature. All communication processes, data
transmission, data analysis, user authentication, and resource
management can be automated and dynamic with real-time
operation. According to the nature of Fog computing, its
security auditing process would be dynamic and within a
real-time process. However, the existing traditional security
auditing standards and the manner of auditing is very manual,
where a technology specialist team or group of individuals
perform their auditing processes using their traditional auditing
standard. The traditional approach is only applicable within a
small environment or with limited resource. However, it is
a problematic approach because this approach provides only
limited support to make an evaluation and the quality of the
audit heavily depends on auditor’s knowledge and experience.
In such cases, several difficulties can be anticipated.
1) Security auditing expert’s knowledge can be inadequate
or inappropriate.
2) To correctly configure out the Fog system’s security,
many organizations or users, find it cumbersome because
of the extensive expenditure to hire security professionals.
Therefore, a software-based automated auditing system,
which can perform on a real-time basis, would be the best
suited solution for the Fog computing environment.
How does Fog security auditing help to mitigate security
breaches and privacy concerns?
Fig. 8. Risk level from user to system
Fog computing provides several security and privacy concerns
for the cloud and traditional computing as well as its own
security flaws. In the Fog environment, there are extensive
amounts of devices, applications and resources which exist
simultaneously and communicate with each other within a
geographically distributed environment. Therefore, there exists
a high opportunity for rapid security and privacy vulnerabili-
ties. There are many security demonstrations which exists for
traditional or cloud computing, but these demonstrations are
not predominantly well-suited with respect to Fog computing.
With the help of auditing Fog security configurations, we can
mitigate these security issues as well as privacy-related issues
for Fog nodes or Fog computing devices. Auditing security
measures are a way of examining for infringement which
potentially exposes the vulnerability of a system.
So, when one focuses on Fog based auditing, there is a need
to see these concern as core to the overall approach:
• To minimize or mitigate risks introduced by Fog
• To identify new threats and defend them
• To evaluate the efficiency of security controls related to
Fog
• To continuously improve policies, processes, procedures
and tools
• To perform knowledge based dynamic periodic auditing
processes
1) Criteria and Current Solutions: Parkinson et al. [146]
proposed a novel Graph-based Security Anomaly Detec-
tion (Graph- BAD) approach that translates the object-based
security configurations into a graph model. Another tech-
nique which was developed can identify vulnerabilities au-
tonomously and perform security auditing of large systems
without the need for expert knowledge.
Bleikertz et al. [147] proposed an algorithm to audit the
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configuration network’s security and the policies of the multi-
tier cloud architecture using Amazon’s EC2 public cloud.
Wang et al. [148] proposed an auditing system for data
storage security by implementing a privacy-preserving auditing
protocol using homomorphic authentication and random mask
techniques for the preservation of privacy against TPA. It can
audit without requiring to have the knowledge of the user’s
data contents. A batch auditing protocol was also introduced
in this study, which can be used to complete multiple auditing
tasks across different users at the same time via TPA. A public
auditing system contains four algorithms such as, KeyGen,
SigGen, GenProof, and VerifyProof. KeyGen is run by the user
to set up the scheme, and to generate the required verification
metadata, of which Siggen is used. GenProof is executed
by the Cloud Server to provide proof of the data storage’s
correctness. VerifyProof is run by TPA to audit the proof from
Cloud Server.
Cong et al. [149] recommended a set of characteristics for
public auditing systems with the aim to focus on data storage
security in public cloud.
Shah et al. [150] proposed several public auditing protocols
which helped not only to check data integrity from the service
provider, but also fraudulent customers. Privacy preservation
is achieved through zero-knowledge, and by concealing data
contents from the auditor. Yang et al. [33] reviewed several
current works on data storage security auditing service in cloud
computing. Mohammed et al. [151] proposed a secure protocol
by a Third Party Auditor (TPA) that ensures the data integrity
in Fog computing. The main drawback of this method is that
the user has to depend on a third party. There should be trust
between the Third Party Auditor(TPA) and user.
2) Existing Security Auditing Standards and Frameworks:
Implementing security governance and auditing frameworks
may support organizations to conduct and manage their
own security risk levels. Various organizations or technology
groups have created renowned frameworks and recommenda-
tions based on the traditional computing or cloud computing
standards [152], [153] which are globally used. Therefore,
the most popular and renowned security audit standards and
frameworks are as follows:
• Service Organization Control (SOC) 2: which is con-
sidered for auditing outsourced services sponsored by the
American Institute of CPAs
• ISO 27000 standards - ISO 27001:2005 and ISO
27002:2005 : Traditional security audits sponsored by
ISO
• CobiT (Control Objectives of Information and
related Technology): sponsored and introduced by
ISACA(Information System Audit and Control Associa-
tion, www.isaca.org) and ITGI (IT Governance Institute,
www.itgi.org). It is the most renowned and extensively
accepted information technology governance framework.
• NIST (www.nist.org) 800-53 revision 4: Federal gov-
ernment audit sponsored by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
• Cloud Security Alliance (CSA): Cloud-specic audit
which is presented to cloud security auditing terms spon-
sored by CSA
• Payment Card Industry (PCI), Data Security Stan-
dard (DSS): PCI Qualied Security Assessor cloud sup-
plement which is sponsored by PCI DSS
• Basel II, ITIL, SANS(www.sans.org), (ISC)2 framework
(www.isc2.org), etc organization which can audit and
manage the levels of IT security risks.
To be effective, the above-mentioned security audit stan-
dards must confirm to a vast number of security concerns in the
traditional computing or cloud computing paradigm. However,
using these traditional auditing standards and frameworks in
the Fog computing environment will not be well suited because
all of these auditing standards and frameworks which are
manual approaches. They can only provide limited support
to make an evaluation and the audit’s quality heavily depends
on an auditor’s experiences and knowledge which could be
problematic, whereas the Fog environment is mostly dynamic
and distributed across a large scale geographically. Therefore,
software based automated auditing standards and frameworks
which can perform real-time approaches would be best suited
for the Fog computing environment.
The principal necessity to introduce cooperative context
aware tools is extensively approved, and actions are being
taken at the state level. Several studies have suggested how
software tools can be used to extract meaningful knowledge to
aid security configurations, auditing, and digital investigations
[154]. Therefore, such tools are context-dependent, in that
their functionality is conducted to identify threats that are
expected. The only limitation of these tools is that each one
requires different knowledge and skills to translate their output
to obtain an understanding of why this extracted knowledge
is significant [155]. Security auditing can be performed in an
automated fashion by using Blockchain technology. The next
section discusses Blockchain technology and what has been
done so far in Fog using Blockchain technology.
V. BLOCAKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY IN FOG
The Blockchain is more than a database technology. Theo-
retically, a Blockchain is a ledger of the distributed database
that can be programmed continuously to record a list of data.
Blockchain is probably Bitcoin’s major innovation foundation
for a new decentralized and distributed system. Recently,
Blockchain technology has been implemented across many
real-time systems [156]. Blockchain is an evolving technology
to build a secure, scalable and openly coordinated platform
globally, which is not limited to currency or financial systems.
Fog with Blockchain is shown in Fig. 9.
A. Security Features of Blockchain Technology
Blockchain technology has its own strong security be-
cause there is no possibility of shutting down the system. A
well-known cryptocurrency - Bitcoin, was implemented using
Blockchain technology. However, the financial system was
still hacked, of which it has never been subjected to before.
The main strength of Bitcoin is its use of the Blockchain
network which is protected against attacks and threats by using
multiple nodes which are committed to a single transaction by
a consensus algorithm on this network. The transaction within
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Blockchain includes digital signatures. Currently, Blockchain
uses the ECDSA public key algorithm to generate a digital
signature. Blockchain prevents a single point of failure be-
cause it is a distributed system. It uses a hash function for
block generation, of which currentlyit uses the SHA-256 hash
function.
Some of the main features of Blockchain are as follows:
• Increased Capacity
• Strong Security
• Immutability
• Faster Settlement
• Decentralized System
• Offers encryption and validation
• Virtually impossible to hack
• Can be private or public
• Minting
B. Role of Blockchain to Improves Security in Fog
The Blockchain technology was introduced for the secured
cryptocurrency application Bitcoin. A realization soon dawned
amongst many researchers that it possesses great security
features which can be utilized in many real-world distributed
applications (e.g. Cloud, and Fog computing). Security has
become a key stumbling block toward the widespread adoption
or implementation of Fog. Therefore, security concerns in Fog
computing can be improved using Blockchain technology 1 2.
3
• Mitigate single point of failure
• Highly encrypted network transactions
• Node status tracking capabilities
• Immutable Technology
Blockchain can mitigate various threats and attacks in Fog
such as the man in the middle attack, DDoS attack, and data
tampering 4 5 6 7.
C. Blockchain between Fog and Edge Environments
Fog computing is a decentralized distribution system which
aims to make cloud computing faster by creating data hubs
or mini data processing centers which are hosted in smart
devices. Basically, they accomplish a less demanding task and
reduce the communication between the cloud and the end user.
Fog allows performing resource-constraints and short-term
analytics near to the edge of the network, whereas the cloud
accomplishes resource-intensive and longer-term analytics.
Fog computing faces enormous challenges and there are
constantly various issues which arise during its primary stages
1https://securitytraning.com/how-blockchain-can-improve-iot-security/
2https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/blockchain-improve-internet-of-
things-security
3https://blogs.cisco.com/innovation/blockchain-and-Fog-made-for-each-
other
4https://bdtechtalks.com/2017/01/11/how-blockchain-can-improve-
cybersecurity/
5https://cybersecurityventures.com/how-blockchain-can-be-used-to-
improve-cybersecurity/
6https://securitycurrent.com/four-ways-improve-security-blockchain/
7https://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/blockchain-
security.html
Fig. 9. Fog with Blockchain
of development. For example, in a distributed computing
environment it is a fact that how to protect its transactions
and network resources with an evenly distributed security
architecture is a challenge. It builds a kind of mesh network
where every Fog node takes part based on their strength. Due
to the distributed architecture of Fog computing, it is highly
required when trust and security must be distributed. This is
particularly significant where the Fog infrastructure, layers and
Fog nodes are managed and owned by diversified entities.
However, a significant question arises in managing trust in
a distributed and decentralized manner amongst participants
that do not need mutual trust. Blockchain technology in reality
is built for this kind of challenge. Blockchain consensus algo-
rithms have a suitability issue with regards to Fog applications.
For instance, “Proof-of-Work” (PoW) consensus needs a huge
computing capacity in order to solve a complex mathematical
puzzle, so Fog devices are unable to host this mechanism. But
there are plenty of other protocols such as “Proof of Stake”
(PoS) which is susceptible to running on Fog nodes with a
similar capacity.
D. Recent Works that Used Blockchain for Fog
Tuli et al. [157] developed a framework which was based
on blockchain for the edge-Fog computing environment. This
framework applied blockchain, encryption techniques and au-
thentication which can perform secure operations across sensi-
tive data. Although this framework is a lightweight and based
on a cross-platform, it has a few limitations and drawbacks
because it takes comparatively higher computational overhead
to carry out large scale deployments.
Sharma et al. [158] introduced a new and efficient dis-
tributed blockchain cloud model based on three emerging tech-
nologies: blockchain, Fog Computing and Software Defined
Network (SDN). This model was presented to support high
scalability, security, high availability, resiliency, real-time data
delivery and low latency.
Jeong et al. [159] proposed a blockchain based secure Fog
computing system. Their system can defend against various
attacks such as IP spoofing, Sybil attacks and single points of
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failure. This system used the Blockchain method to guarantee
secure authentication and non-repudiation. It can also perform
when a Fog node is down.
Samaniego et al. [160] investigated the idea of virtual
software-defined IoT components known as virtual resources
in combination with the use of blockchain technology.
Dorri et al. [161] introduced a secure, private and
lightweight blockchain-based technology for the resource con-
straints related to IoT devices which can handle most security
and privacy threats. It uses different kinds of blockchains based
on the network hierarchy and uses distributed trust methods
to assure a decentralized topology.
E. Blockchain Oriented Startups in Fog and IoT Environments
OpenFog Consortium is one of the most well-known
Blockchain oriented startups in the Fog environment. The
OpenFog consortium is in the process of building a compos-
able and interoperable framework for Blockchain in the Fog
distributed system. That implies that the various entities in
the system that do not trust or are even known to each other
still provide a meaningful consensus algorithm which is able
to make decisions in a Fog oriented distributed system. The
autonomy which is one of the eight pillars of OpenFog, is
supported by the Consortium’s work.
Recently, there have been multiple Blockchain oriented
startups which have joined the OpenFog Consortium [162]
they are as follows:
• iExec: It Is the first Blockchain-Based Decentralized
marketplace for Cloud Computing. It provides distributed
applications that are secure, easily accessible and scalable
to the services of computing resources for data-sets that
are needed as well as the systems running on Blockchain
(DApps).
• KeyChain: A new Global Blockchain-based data secu-
rity infrastructure. It provides secure decentralized data
authentication for the enterprise, finance environments,
industries, and IoT.
• Aetherworks: Brings original, high-quality technologies
to the market and provides original software for dis-
tributed systems, including Fog computing and software-
defined storages.
• Hyperchain: Provides an enterprise-level Blockchain
network-based solution for government agencies, supply
chain, data trading, fraud prevention, and securities. It
also supports enterprises to rapidly deploy, expand and
configure Blockchain networks based on the Blockchain
cloud platform.
• SONM: Provides infrastructure and can run any decen-
tralized application (Fog application) or host Blockchain-
based services. It also provides Fog computing distributed
cloud computing services such as IaaS and PaaS, which
are secured by Blockchain.
• Xage: The foremost Blockchain-protected security tool
for the industrial IoT. Traditionally, more points of se-
curity vulnerability arise when there are more nodes and
more connections. Moreover, the centralization technol-
ogy prevents industrial systems working independently
and in real time. Xage ensures that with the combinations
of Blockchain and encryption that more nodes mean more
security, not less.
VI. RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTION
In this section, we are going to present and highlight a
few significant and considerable issues which are challenging
tasks for Fog computing to cope with in cloud and edge
environments. Finally, we provide a synopsis of probable
research directions based on the existing research challenges.
A. Trust Management
Identification of trusted Fog nodes is a challenging task in
the Fog platform. Usually, a Fog node is trusted or untrusted
can be identified by its malicious behavior. But in this case,
the malicious nature is not defined earlier-on for a Fog
node. Therefore, it is significant to define and categorize all
malicious characteristics in the Fog system. The Fog system
can be susceptible to regulate if a Fog node is trusted or
untrusted. Hence, it is mandatory to enhance trust and after
all an exalted trust management model is highly required.
Another challenging research issue is, combining both dis-
tributed and centralized environments which is must and im-
portant in the context of cloud-Fog-IoT environments. There-
fore, a centralized trust management is required for the IoT
environment and it would be possible by using a Fog platform.
Hence, it’s still a research issue.
Moreover, trust management in Fog platform is entirely
different compared to the cloud computing platform due to
the distinctions of the cloud and Fog platform architecture
and services offering mechanism. As mentioned earlier, Fog
is widely distributed, on the other hand, cloud is centralized.
In that case it is easier to deploy trust management in the cloud
environment because the cloud platform has its own in-place
security infrastructure, whereas the Fog platform is more open,
and the in-place security mechanism is absent. As a result,
the Fog is vulnerable to malicious attacks. In addition, trust in
the cloud environment is unidirectional, whereas trust in the
Fog environment would be bidirectional in nature. The Fog
node and the IoT devices must maintain a trusted relationship
between one another before their interaction, as it is highly
required in the Fog platform. Hence, designing a bidirectional
trust model in the context of Fog and the IoT platform is a
challenging task as well.
B. Privacy Assurance
The Fog nodes hold sensitive or private information of users,
as the Fog nodes are placed in the proximity of the end
users. Therefore, it is a challenging issue to assure trusted
communication and make a secure computing environment
between the Fog and IoT devices. In such a case, we can
consider encrypting the user sensitive data before sending it
to the Fog nodes. It is not viewed as a proper technique
in the context of IoT devices, since conventional encryption
and decryption mechanisms need much computational power,
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whereas the IoT devices faces challenges to encrypt and
decrypt the user’s sensitive data due to the resource constraints
of IoT devices.
In another context, a single Fog node can manage sensitive
data which comes from different Fog users or across different
applications. Therefore, there might be a chance to mix up
different sources of data after the data aggregation step. In
such a case, enforcing proper data encapsulation techniques
at the Fog API or middleware level would be the solution.
Hence, more research is needed.
Another challenging issue is to provide context-aware ser-
vices in the Fog environment to the end user devices which
are often involved in sharing sensitive resources such as
location, as well as others personal information amongst
other geographically connected devices. Therefore, in such
a scenario, it is highly required to ensure data protection is
present. Hence, providing the identity and location privacy in
the Fog environment is a challenging task.
C. Authentication
It is an obvious fact that strong authentication and secure
communication protocols in the Fog platform are missing.
It is a rather alarming message for the research community.
There has not been much research about the authentication
mechanism in the area of Fog computing. Although, several
researchers have already proposed several solutions which we
described earlier in the taxonomy section. However, those
solutions are still not able to cope with the Fog platform.
Therefore, to design and develop a new authentication method
for Fog computing, one must consider the following criteria
and how that it can cope up with the Fog platform smoothly.
• Authentication mechanisms must be compatible with the
Fog user, end devices(IoT devices), application services
and Fog Service providers on the cloud-Fog-IoT platform.
• Conventional authentication mechanisms are inefficient,
and there is a necessity for a secure, environment-friendly,
efficient, and scalable solution to cope up with extensive
amount of IoT devices which has limited resource to
facilitated scalability and efficiency.
• Security and performance are both highly required in
terms of different contextual devices and applications.
• Must meet the dynamic behavior of the Fog environment,
where Fog nodes dynamically leave and join frequently
in the Fog network.
• Must ensure low complexity-based authentication in
terms of scalability of the Fog network.
• Ensure smooth authentication and re-authentication meth-
ods in a dynamic manner.
• Design an efficient authentication method, of which a
cryptographic lightweight encryption algorithm should be
considered between the Fog system and the IoT devices
that can easily cope with the low processing power of
IoT devices.
• Authentication should be less costly, as well as provide
high usability and in return should be user friendly.
D. Access Control
In terms of the authentication mechanisms, there has not
been much research work about access control methods in
the Fog computing environment. However, plenty of work
has been done in this field. Therefore, we still need to be
able to accomplish an efficient design to draw the right kind
of potential access and control model, with the intention to
facilitate a secure platform within the heterogeneous devices
in the Fog environment.
In the description section of access control, we mentioned
a few access control models, describing their various features,
characteristics and in the context of the Fog environment, we
also highlighted numerous drawbacks and limitations. Many
researchers have mentioned that Attribute Based Encryp-
tion(ABE) would be suitable as a method of owning access to
control in the cloud, Fog and IoT environments. Because of
the heterogeneous characteristics of the Fog system, the ABE
method should be reconstructed in order to mitigate the ma-
jor challenges (Latency, policy-management, fine-grained and
enforced by the cryptographic method) amongst the Cloud-
Fog-IoT computing environment users.
On the other hand, in the Fog system, data originates, is
encrypted and decrypted by miniaturized devices with low
computational powers. In such a case, deploying access control
mechanisms in that devices would be a burden and would
need heavy computational powers to process the access control
mechanism. Meanwhile, Fog devices are being placed near end
devices. In addition, Fog devices are much more computation-
ally powerful than end user IoT devices. Therefore, to over-
come the limitations of IoT devices, an outsource capability
lightweight ABE based access control would be compatible
with the Fog environment. As opposed to, Fog computing,
which is dynamic in nature, there are numerous devices which
join and leave simultaneously in the Fog network., So, the
access control policy and attributes of the users would be
changed according to this dynamic characteristic. Therefore, it
is highly required that ABE-based access control mechanisms
must have the capability to assist in creating, updating, as
well as revoking the attributes of the users. With ABE based
access control, designing the revocation process would faces
new challenges, and how Fog collaborates with the cloud
environment during the revocation process would need to be
part of further research.
Therefore, to design a new access control method for the
Fog platform, one must consider a few characteristics which
are as follows:
• As we have mentioned earlier, Fog is a fully virtualized
platform by nature and it provides diversified environ-
ments for the Fog network. In this case, there might be
a chance in which a side-channeled-attack occurs due
to the nature of sharing resources amongst untrusted
tenants. Therefore, it is a significant concern in terms
of designing an access control method which must be
capable to synthesize within the virtualized platform and
multitenant environment efficiently, and securely.
• Access control should be secure and efficient for the Fog
environment computing on the basis of multi-authority,
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as well as attribute-based, considering low computation
with outsourcing capabilities as well as attributes have
the means to control user revocation capability.
• An access control method should be lightweight and fine-
grained due to the resource constraints suffered amongst
IoT devices.
• An access control method must be capable to perform in
both centralized and distributed architectural environment
accordingly.
E. Threats and Attacks
As we mentioned earlier, Fog computing faces various
security and privacy issues. Due to the distributed nature and
extensive amount of devices connected with it, often, there
might be a chance for a threat or an attack to occur. In
the description section, we have already highlighted several
threats and attacks and their impact in the Fog environment.
Detection, identification and mitigation of these threats and
attacks would be a challenging task in terms of the dynamic
Fog computing environment. However, in order to build a
reliable and trustworthy Fog platform, there is a research
gap and the lack of security solutions available to detect and
identify these threats and attacks needs to be addressed. Based
on our review across various threats and attacks, we have
suggested the following issues which need to be addressed
in the future to overcome these challenges:
• Complex trust situations and insecure authentication and
authorization systems.
• Dynamic behavior such as creating, deleting, joining and
leaving of Fog nodes, or servers in the Fog layer.
• Detection of malicious nodes or rogue nodes is a chal-
lenging task because of the dynamic nature of leaving
and joining by the Fog nodes.
• Implementing IDS in large-scale, geo-distributed with
low-latency requirement with highly mobile Fog com-
puting systems is a complex task.
• Due to the distributed environment, hybrid detection
techniques are required to identify malicious activities.
• Due to the resource constraints of the Fog devices,
designing a high security and low cost threat and attack
detection is the key problem in the Fog.
• Identification and mitigation threats and attacks from
both the Fog node and Fog user at the same time is
challenging.
F. Security Auditing
Audit rights provide a crucial risk mitigation tool regarding
security issues related to the Fog. Auditing security configura-
tions in the Fog platform is a complex task, as it is a gateway
to the cloud platform and heavily relies on expert knowledge,
which is required for understanding the different security
configurations. However, these systems can be imperfect, and
not user friendly for the home users and small companies.
In this Section, we explore various unique challenges that
isolate Fog security auditing from the traditional security
auditing or cloud security auditing protocols. These challenges
represent the significance of special provisions for Fog security
auditing in current or evolving security auditing standards.
Challenges:
• The Fog computing landscape is dynamic and consists
of huge resources, where traditional data encryption or
decryption needs heavy computational overhead.
• Without proper technological support, it is challenging to
manage extensive amounts of different contextual data.
• To identify new security threats and defend against those
threats is also a challenging task
• Fog computing brings easy accessibility to our work
and personal lives, but with that accessibility comes new
security risks and challenges
• Understanding the different contexts of the Fog com-
puting environment is important. Different contexts with
regards to the environment’s security issues would bring
about different.
Questions:
• How to encrypt or decrypt data and how to access that
data simultaneously?
• How to perform auditing processes across different envi-
ronment data contexts?
• Do you use the same matrix for the edge environment or
cloud environment?
• Can your current risk assessment capture the risks cor-
rectly?
• How to perform and manage real-time processing and
auditing at the same time?
In order to overcome the above-mentioned challenges and
questions, it is highly required to develop an automatic
method, which can be capable to recognize and identify
security infringements as well as mitigate those security risks
in Fog computing. Further research needs to be carried out by
utilizing Blockchain technology to mitigate security issues in
Fog.
G. Secure 5G Enable Fog Network
In the near future, Fog devices will be connected through
the 5G network. Connecting Fog devices with 5G network
emerging new security challenges in mainly in the authentica-
tion. The traditional one-way or mutual authentication process
is not useful due to the authentication process between the user
and services [163]. In this case, a new hybrid authentication
model is required. Using 5G, Fog will be useful to talk
with things and devices. For example, in a smart home and
smart city environment, one citizen needs an ambulance which
will direct him to a specialized hospital near to the location
of the user where a remote surgery can perform. Here, a
hybrid security mechanism is required to secure the whole
application environment since many parties are involved in
this processing. Any emergency environment similar to this
requires a strong and reliable authentication process. User
privacy is also important in such 5G enable Fog computing
environment. Because, user data may pass through the various
untrusted, third-party devices, network equipment, and access
networks. Hence, we need to explore more about hybrid
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authentication methods and privacy protection in 5G enable
Fog network.
VII. CONCLUSION
The main objective of this study is to review, investigate and
analyze the issues of the Fog computing platform to recognize
their probable security flaws. The obvious fact is that, there are
numerous security issues that did not exists in the traditional
cloud computing environment, of which need to be considered,
as well as significant developments in the Fog environment.
We fill the gap of the current literature by aggregating all
security aspects of Fog computing paradigm. We have also
investigated the main challenges, and tried to exhibit the
motives as to why the security methods in the cloud platform
cannot be employed directly in Fog computing when it comes
to auditing. In this study, we have introduced a taxonomy, by
considering numerous security issues and protection according
to the Fog environment, as well as briefly introduced and
discussed these issues retrospectively. In addition, we also
discussed how blockchain could help to provide solutions to
some of the data security concerns in the Fog environment.
At the end, we highlighted several threats and attacks which
might be occur frequently under the circumstances of the Fog
computing network.
Interestingly the Fog is a new paradigm, which therefore
requires mitigation of the associated security issues which are
still challenging tasks. With regards to the system architecture
of Fog computing, researchers need to do further future work
and figure out the challenges with respect to security within the
three tier architecture of the cloud-Fog-IoT computing system.
As Fog computing is an extension of cloud computing, in this
paper we only covered the security issues concepts related to
Fog. We did not consider the security-related issues in the
cloud.
In the future, we will be investigating and comparing and
other similarly distributed environments and present these
security issues and suitable solutions for the Fog.
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